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NEXUS AND JURISDICTION
When may. a State Impose an Obligation to Pay,
Or Collect and Remit Taxes, on a Company?
When does a Company have the right to allocate and apportion its income?
How do these concepts influence Virginia and sales and use
and corporate income tax planning techniques?
Overview
This presentation reviews the powers of the states, including Virginia, to tax, and
the corresponding responsibility of taxpayers to pay or collect and remit taxes and
file returns. The determination of whether a taxpayer has sufficient contacts or
nexus with a state to allow the state to require the taxpayer to pay or collect and
remit taxes is a difficult process.
Various federal constitutional and statutory doctrines and constraints as well as
those existing at the state level must be considered. The level or degree of contact
between a taxpayer and a state necessary to allow imposition of a tax varies not
only with regard to the state but also with regard to the type of tax.
Despite these obstacles, it has become increasingly important for taxpayers to
determine when sufficient nexus exists for a state to impose an income or franchise
tax or a duty to collect and remit sales and use taxes. Many states have increased
penalty provisions and enforcement efforts following amnesty programs. A few
states require certain corporations to file disclosure spreadsheets detailing where
and how returns are filed. These spreadsheets, together with multistate tax
compacts designed to assist states in sharing information, enable states to more
efficiently determine when corporations should be paying and remitting taxes.
Conversely, determining when Virginia domiciled taxpayers are taxable outside of
Virginia may impact the amount of taxes paid or remitted to Virginia. For
corporate income tax purpose, taxpayers who are taxable outside of Virginia are
not taxed in Virginia on 100% of their income, but instead are allowed to
apportion their income among the states in which they are taxable by use of a
statutorily prescribed apportionment formula. In certain cases, this may result in
more or less than 100% of the corporation's income being taxed, thus presenting
planning opportunities and pitfalls.
Further, the operation of other Virginia tax statutes, such as the ability to elect to
file separate, combined or consolidated returns for an affiliated group of
corporations, depends on the determination of which entities within the affiliated
group individually are taxable in Virginia. As a result, it is important that a
taxpayer be able to identify its contacts with each state and ascertain whether these
contacts are sufficient to allow that state to subject the taxpayer to its taxing
powers.
This outline reviews the states' power to tax corporations in the context of both
the states' taxing statutes and the general federal constitutional and statutory
limitations on a state's power to tax. However, greatest emphasis will be on the
federal limitations on a state's power to tax. As a general rule, states, unless
constrained by their constitutions or. statutory language, have an unlimited power
to tax. Most state statutes have broad, vague definitions of what entities or
transactions are subject to its taxing power. Thus, scant guidance is generally
given regarding the subjects of such taxing power. The history of the study of
state taxation has been one of the federal limitations on such power -- not the
state's implicit jurisdiction to tax.
Both corporate income taxes and sales and use tax nexus will be discussed. The
integration of these concepts with Virginia's statutory provisions regarding the
ability to allocate and apportion income and file separate, combined or
consolidated returns and other Virginia income and sales and use tax planning
techniques will also be explored.
U. Background
A. What is Nexus?
The term "nexus" is derived from the Latin nectere, meaning "to tie." It
refers to the connection, link or contacts between a state and a taxpayer.
In its broadest sense, nexus refers not only to a state's jurisdiction to tax,
but also to the state's ability to assert legal jurisdiction of any kind over a
person or a corporation, whether it be the power to require the defense of a
lawsuit in the state, the power to regulate or the power to impose taxes.
However, for purposes of this presentation, nexus will be used to refer to
the level of contacts or connection between a state and a taxpayer sufficient
to subject the taxpayer to the taxing jurisdiction of the state.
B. Development of State Taxes
State tax systems developed in colonial times based on the local economy
(e.g., in New England where property ownership was more evenly
distributed, taxes were imposed on the gross produce of the land, and, in
towns, occupational taxes were imposed; in the southern colonies where
property ownership was less evenly distributed, property taxes were
insignificant and excise taxes predominated).
During the nineteenth century, property taxes predominated. In the north,
taxes on banks, insurance companies, railroads and other businesses began
to supplement the property tax. In the South, license and privilege taxes
were the main supplements. During the twentieth century, the importance
of property taxes has declined (at the state level). Income and sales taxes
became the predominant source of state revenue. For 1991, 33.2% of state
revenue was from sales taxes; 32% from individual income taxes; and only
6.6% from corporate income taxes.
C. State "Doing Business" Statutes
Most states have "doing business" statutes that impose taxes on
corporations having certain contacts with those states. States' standards
for imposing an income tax generally refer to: "doing business," "earning
income from sources in the state," "employing capital," or "owning or
leasing property," or some such similar phrase. Generally, state statutes
that define doing business require very little in the way of activity in a state
for the state to have jurisdiction to impose its tax. Consequently, the doing
business statutes generally add little to the U.S. constitutional limitations
on the state's power to impose net income taxes. The term "doing
business" also may appear in other contexts, such as a corporate
qualification statute or a civil jurisdiction "long-arm" statute. While in
some states the term "doing business" carries the same meaning in the tax
and non-tax contexts, it should not be assumed that such is the case.
11. General Federal Constitutional Limitations
The principal federal constitutional limitations on a state's power to tax multistate
corporations are independently imposed by the Commerce Clause (U.S. Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3) and the Due Process Clause (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, Sec.
1). For a state to constitutionally impose a tax on a corporation, there must be
"nexus" or some minimum connection between the corporation and the taxing
state. If a corporation has no nexus in a state, it is unconstitutional for the state to
impose taxes on the corporation.
The history of the application of these constitutional constraints on the ability of a
state to tax a nonresident or out-of-state corporation has been one of gradual
expansion of the state's power to tax or regulate the out-of-state person or entity.
A. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress has the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." Taxation may so burden interstate commerce as to amount
to a regulation thereof See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 232 (1872) (the first decision invalidating a state tax as a
violation of the unexercised power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce). Congress has rarely exercised this authority. See Public Law
86-272, 15 U.S.C. 381 (1959) (restricting the power of states to tax certain
out-of-state corporations).
Thus, over the years, the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as not
only conferring power on the national government to regulate commerce,
but also.as limiting the states' power to interfere with commerce. This
restriction on the state's power often is referred to as the "negative
implication of the Commerce Clause" or as the "dormant Commerce
Clause" principle.. Under the dormant Commerce Clause principle the
United States Supreme Court has struck down as unconstitutional a variety
of state regulatory and taxation measures as unduly burdening interstate
commerce.
1. What is Commerce?
For constitutional purposes, commerce is defined very broadly. As
stated in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:
it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all of its branches.
Accordingly, most economic activity is considered commerce.
Professional sports, theatrical productions, legal services and the
operations of a public utility holding company have all been held to
constitute commerce. Insurance, though originally not considered
commerce, was later held to constitute commerce subject to federal
regulation. Congress later removed this barrier to state regulation
of insurance. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015
(1982). The key is determining whether interstate or foreign
commerce as opposed to purely intrastate commerce is implicated.
2. Historical Perspective - Free Trade Zone
As early as 1827, the Supreme Court adopted a "free trade"
approach to state taxation of interstate commerce, exempting
interstate commerce from state taxation. See Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. 419 (1827). As stated in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127
U.S. 640, 648 (1888):
[N]o state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce
in any form,... and the reason is that such taxation is a
burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it,
which belongs solely to Congress.
However, the Court recognized that states retained the power to
regulate and to tax matters primarily of local concern even if those
matters affected interstate commerce. Thus, there were two types
of activities, those national in scope subject to exclusive regulation
.by Congress and those local in scope in which the states had
concurrent powers to regulate.
3. Historical Perspective - Direct and Indirect Burdens
In the late 1800's, the Court began to increasingly talk about the
direct or indirect burdens on interstate commerce in determining the
validity of a state tax. A direct burden was impermissible. An
indirect burden was allowed.
The touchstone for judicial condemnation was not any actual or
probable hampering of interstate commerce but simply its direct
bearing or effect on interstate commerce. A state could not tax
interstate commerce even if the tax applied equally to local
commerce.
For example, in Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), a state
tax on the gross receipts derived from the sale of securities was
struck down. The opinion squarely stated that a tax could not be
saved by a showing that it applied without discrimination to
interstate and intrastate commerce:
It is true that the existence of a tax on its local commerce
detracts from the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate
commerce to the extent that it removes the temptation to
sell the goods locally. But the fact of such a tax, in any
event, puts impediments upon the currents of commerce
across the State line.
However, a levy on a local activity would be upheld even if the tax
were measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce. This
was regarded as only an indirect burden on interstate commerce.
See, e.g., American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459
(1919) (local license tax on manufacturing measured by total gross
receipts upheld as subject of tax was the local activity of
manufacturing).
It was this formalistic approach to determining which taxes directly
impacted interstate commerce and thus were an unconstitutional
burden on it that lead many states to adopt a tiered system of
taxation: a direct net income tax (for intrastate business) and a
franchise tax on the privilege of doing business instate (a local
activity even if measured by income from interstate commerce).
The Court began to recognize the mechanical and formalistic nature
of this test, noting in a dissenting opinion that the test was "too
mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from
actualities to be of value." DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34
(1927). Eleven years later the Court appeared to shift from the
direct-indirect test to a more realistic cumulative burdens test in
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). In
this case involving the imposition of a New Mexico franchise tax
measured by gross receipts, the tax on a magazine which was based
in New Mexico but received advertising from non-New Mexico
persons and had non-New Mexico circulation, was upheld. In the
Court's view:
[T]he tax assailed here finds support in reason, and in the
practical needs of a taxing system which, under
constitutional limitations, must accommodate itself to the
double demand that interstate business shall pay its way, and
that at the same time it shall not be burdened with
cumulative exactions which are not similarly laid on local
business.
During this period, the Court upheld a number of state taxes
imposed on interstate businesses where there were substantial local
business activities, the tax imposed did not discriminate against
interstate commerce vis-i-vis a local business and the tax was fairly
apportioned. See United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,
247 U.S. 321 (1918); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 U.S. 113 (1920); and Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State
Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
4. Northwestern States Portland Cement and the Advent of
Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and
Williams v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450
(1959), the Court confirmed that a state may with proper drafting
tax exclusively interstate commerce. Northwestern Cement sold
cement to Minnesota customers through employee/salespersons out
of a leased office in Minnesota. Stockholm Valves sold valves and
fittings in Georgia in a similar manner. The Court observed that:
It is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to immunize
such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of
the state government in return for the benefits it derives
from within the state.
It strains reality to say.., that each of the corporations here
was not sufficiently involved in local events to forge 'some
definite link, some minimum connection' sufficient to satisfy
due process requirements.
The presence of a local office or place of business in the state was
regarded as "doing business" in the state sufficient to constitute the
conduct of a business locally as opposed to a purely interstate
business. In essence, the critical distinction made that a tax on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce would be invalidated
whereas a tax whose subject was the net income derived from such
commerce would be upheld. See also Spector Motor Service v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
In Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute that imposed a franchise tax on
the qualification to carry on business or the doing of business in
corporate form. An earlier tax on the privilege of doing business
instate had been struck down. This decision whittled the exemption
of interstate commerce down to a reductio ad absurdum that a tax
on a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing an exclusively
interstate business is repugnant to the Commerce Clause whereas a
tax on foreign corporations for the privilege of doing such a
business in the state in the corporate form -- the only form in which
corporations can do business -- is permissible.
5. Complete Auto Transit and the Modern Commerce Clause
In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court
enunciated the modem Commerce Clause test for determining
whether a state tax is unconstitutional. The Court completely
repudiated its earlier prohibition on direct taxation of the privilege
of doing business in interstate commerce. The Court held that a
state tax will survive Commerce Clause scrutiny "when the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State."
In other decisions, the Court has weaken the independent
significance of two of the prongs of this test. In Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court
determined that it was beyond its province to invalidate state
apportionment methods even though they may result in duplicative
taxation. This case involved the imposition of Iowa's single-factor
apportionment formula on an Illinois company which apportioned
its income in other states based on the traditional three-factor
formula.
The "fairly related to the services provided by the state" test was
emasculated in Commonwealth Edision Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609 (1981). This case involved the imposition of Montana's thirty
percent coal severance tax on producers of coal. Ninety percent of
the coal mined in Montana was shipped out-of-state. The Court
observed that general revenue taxes need not be "reasonable related
to the value of the service provided to the activity." The Court
viewed the test as not requiring a comparison of the amount of the
tax to the cost to the state of the benefits it bestowed on the
taxpayer, but whether "the measure... [is] reasonably related to
the extent of the contact, since it is the activities or presence of the
taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a just share
of State tax burden."
In determining whether a tax is fairly apportioned, the Court has
examined whether the tax is internally and externally consistent. To
be internally consistent, the tax must be structured so that no
multiple taxation would result if, hypothetically, each state imposed
an identical tax. The external consistency test looks at whether the
state taxes only that portion of the taxpayer's income that
reasonably reflects its in-state activities. See, e.g., Container Corp.
ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983);
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has provided no clear cut test for
determining what constitutes discrimination prohibited under the
Commerce Clause, the Court has, in recent years, found a number
of state taxes to be unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court
often relies on an analysis of relative tax burdens in reviewing the
discriminatory impact of a tax. If the state imposes greater state tax
burdens on certain taxpayers than on others, discrimination may
exist. See, e.g., Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1987) (state
may not tax transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses
state lines than when it occurs entirely within one state).
Impermissible discrimination may also exist when the tax interferes
with the businessperson's independent economic decisions
regarding the location of his or her business. See, e.g., Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (credit allowed against instate
taxes rendered tax discriminatory as it encouraged investment
within Louisiana rather than in. other states).
For a period of time, many commentators questioned whether the
Commerce Clause independently added requirements to those
independently imposed by the Due Process Clause. As noted in the
following section, it was believed that the Due Process Clause
independently required nexus (minimal connection) and
apportionment and a fair relationship between the tax and the
benefits provided by the state (a rational relationship between the
income attributed to the state and the instate value of the
enterprise). Thus, the Commerce Clause was seen as only adding
the requirement that the tax not discriminate against interstate
commerce. However, as more fully described below, the Court's
decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota revealed a significant
difference in the Commerce Clause's substantial nexus and the Due
Process Clause's minimal connection nexus standards.
B. Due Process Clause
Unlike the Commerce Clause, which is an affirmative grant of authority to
Congress to regulate commerce between the states, the Due Process
Clause specifically limits the states' power to impose taxes. The Due
Process clause states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." The connection between
the Due Process clause and the field of state taxation is that the taxation of
a person is regarded as the deprivation of that person's property which, of
course, cannot occur without due process of law.
1. Judicial Origins of the Due Process Limitations
The juridical test of the states' jurisdiction to tax income accruing
to nonresidents is rooted in two cases decided on the same day:
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) and Travis v. Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
In Shaffer, the taxpayer was an Illinois resident who owned and
operated oil and gas producing properties and leases in Oklahoma.
The taxpayer argued that since he conducted his business in his
office in Illinois, Oklahoma was precluded from taxing his income
derived from the properties. The Court held that a state could not
only tax the income of its residents but also could tax nonresidents
on the income generated from property or business conducted
within the state. The Court stated that:
We deem it clear, upon principle as well as authority, that
just as a State may impose general income taxes upon its
own citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its
control, it may, as a necessary consequence, levy a duty of
like character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon
incomes accruing to nonresidents from their property or
business within the State, or their occupations carried on
therein.
In Travis, the taxpayer contended that while New York had the
power to tax the property of a nonresident, the state lacked the
power to tax the income earned by a nonresident from businesses or
occupations conducted within its borders. The Court observed
that:
The State, from whose laws property and business and
industry derive the protection and security without which
production and gainful occupation would be impossible, is
debarred from exacting a share of those gains in the form of
income taxes for the support of the government, is a
proposition so wholly inconsistent with fundamental
principles as to be refuted by its mere statement.
The Court's decisions established a standard of fairness in state
taxation that continues to the present time. The standard suggests
that so long as there is a sufficient contact or nexus between the
taxing state and the nonresident taxpayer's instate activities, the tax
will be upheld.
The Court's most frequently cited and quoted description of this
standard is found in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435
(1940). This case dealt with the power of a state to subject
dividends received by a foreign corporation from property and
activities in the state to taxation. In the case, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies,
unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation
to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it
has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact
of being an orderly, civilized society .... The test is
whether property was taken without due process of law, or
if paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by
the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities
and benefits given by the state. The. simple but controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return.
2. Development of the Due Process Minimal Connections
Requirements
In the landmark decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
327 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court held that the Due Process Clause
requires only "minimum contacts" to support a state's assertion of
jurisdiction over a non-resident. The Court expressly adopted a
fairness test, stating that the Due Process Clause requires only that
the non-resident or non-domiciliary corporation have sufficient
contacts with the state that subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the
state does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
In International Shoe, which involved both the power of the state
to assert its taxing jurisdiction against a non-domiciliary
corporation and the state's power to subject the corporation to the
jurisdiction of its courts in proceedings to determine such tax
liability, the Court also indicated that no greater contacts were
required to establish the taxing jurisdiction of the state than were
needed to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of the state's
courts. In fact, the Court affirmatively equated the standards for
the two types ofjurisdiction: "The activities which establish its
'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to
recover the tax."
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957), the Court upheld California's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign insurance company whose only contact
with the state consisted of soliciting insurance contracts by mail
from outside the state. Contrast this decision with that in Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) in which the Court rejected
Florida's attempt to assert in personam jurisdiction over a
Delaware trustee that did not have an office in the state, transacted
no business in the state and solicited no business in the state. The
Court noted that "it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."
More recently in a products liability case World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court in holding that
Oklahoma could not subject a nonresident automobile dealer to in
personam jurisdiction noted the following factors which would
have been sufficient "affiliating circumstances" to allow such
jurisdiction to be asserted:
" closing sales instate
" soliciting business instate through salespersons or advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the state
" regularly selling cars to Oklahoma residents
" directly or indirectly seeking to serve the Oklahoma market
Finally, in another non-tax Due Process decision Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzwicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1984), the Court held that a
foreign corporation which purposefully avails itself of the benefits
of an economic market in a state may be subjected to inpersonam
jurisdiction, noting that:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided
merely because the defendant did not physically enter the
forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will
enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a State and
reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an
inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial
amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire
communications across state lines, thus obviating the need
for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State,
we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.
The Due Process Clause is concerned with fundamental fairness and
notice to the individual taxpayer (i.e., it requires a taxpayer be given
a "fair warning"). Accordingly, the due process "minimum
contacts" nexus test may be satisfied without requiring physical
presence in a particular state.
M. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions and Corresponding Factors Constituting
Sufficient Nexus
A. In-State Office
The maintenance of an office or other place of business in a state is
sufficient to create nexus in that state. See Northwestern States Portland
Cement, supra. Moreover, it would generally appear that transactional
nexus is not required, i.e., a direct relationship between the non-
domiciliary's in-state office and its in-state selling activities. See Nelson v.
Sears, Roebuck and Company, 312 U.S. 359 (1941) (use tax collection);
Nelson v. Montgomery Ward& Co., 2312 U.S. 373 (1941) (use tax
collection); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560
(1975) (gross receipts tax); National Geographic Society v. State Board of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977) (in-state place of business totally
unrelated to mail-order sales made to California customers creates
sufficient nexus to impose use tax collection duty); and D.H. Holmes Co. v.
McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (in-state stores sufficient nexus to allow
impose of use tax on catalogues mailed to in-state residents).
B. In-State Employees or Representatives
The first case upholding the imposition of tax on an out-of-state
corporation without an in-state office was General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Commission ofIowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) which imposed a use tax
collection duty based solely on instate solicitation of orders by employees
with no instate place of business. The following year in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court held that the taxpayer
who had no offices or other place of business and no stock of goods in the
state but had employees who solicited orders for acceptance at and filling
by shipment from out-of-state locations had sufficient presence to be
subject to the state's unemployment compensation tax.
After the Northeastern States Portland Cement decision, some have
interpreted the Court as indirectly applying the above principle to two
cases involving net income taxes. The Court denied certiorari in two
Louisiana cases in which the state court had upheld the imposition of a tax
on foreign corporations whose only presence instate were employees of the
foreign corporation. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of
Revenue, 101 So.2d 70 (La. 1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 28 (1959) and
International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 107 So.2d 640 (La. 1958), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 984 (1959).
More recently, the Court, in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington
Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975), upheld the imposition of
Washington's business and occupation tax on an out-of-state corporation
which had only one employee in Washington who performed non-sales
engineering functions instate, stating that the question of whether Due
Process nexus existed was a question "in the context of the present case
bordering on the frivolous. For appellant's employee ... with a full-time
job within the State, made possible the realization and continuance of
valuable contractual relations between appellant and Boeing."
C. In-State Independent Contractors
In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), the Court found the
presence of independent contractors in the taxing state gave rise to a use
tax collection duty for the out-of-state corporation employing the
independent contractors. In the Court's opinion, the distinction between
solicitation by employees and solicitation by independent contractors was
without constitutional significance: either method of solicitation was
effective in creating and holding a market.
For a period of time, it was thought that this rule only applied to
transactional as opposed to operational taxes. However, in Tyler Pipe
Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232
(1987), Scripto was approvingly cited in upholding the constitutionality of
Washington's business and occupation tax as applied to an out-of-state
corporation whose only contact with the state was through an independent
sales representative. The Court stated that a "showing of sufficient nexus
could not be defeated by the argument that the taxpayer's representative
was properly characterized as an independent contractor instead of as an
agent .... '[T]he crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities
performed ... on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with
the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market... for the sales."'
D. In-State Fixed Property
It seems well settled that the presence of real or tangible personal property
instate is sufficient to create nexus within the state. See Heublin, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275 (1972); Consolidated
Accessories Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1036 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984); Chattanooga Glass Co. v. Strickland, 261 S.E.2d 599
(Ga. 1974); Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Revenue, 511 P.2d
837 (Ore. 1973). One key issue is whether consigned inventory represents
a true consignment (nexus) or a conditional sale (no nexus). For situations
in which the presence of instate property was insufficient to create nexus
see Comptroller of the Treasury v. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., No. 1776,
Slip. Op. (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1989) (property at instate printer did not
create nexus) and Signal Thready. King, 435 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1968)
(storage of inventory out-of-state not sufficient to allow apportionment).
In the sales tax area, the Connecticut superior court ruled that property
instate for a "preview" period prior to purchasing the films was not
sufficient to create nexus instate. Cally Curtis Co. v. Groppo, Case No.
319654 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
E. In-State Moveable Property
State courts have issued differing opinions on whether the use of moveable
tangible personal property by the lessee or licensee of the taxpayer who
moved the property instate in interstate commerce was sufficient nexus for
taxation of the lessor-licensor. In American Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 395 P.2d 127 (Ore. 1964), the state imposed its
income tax on an out-of-state lessor who had no rental agreement with any
railroad operating in Oregon, but whose cars under railroad interchange
practices were in Oregon even though the taxpayer had no control over the
cars' routing, movement, interchange or use. Arkansas and Oklahoma
courts have agreed with this decision. Kentucky and Georgia courts have
disagreed.
In Appeal of U-Haul of Van Nuys, Cal. St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) Para. 401-489
(S.B.E. 1987), the Board held that Amerco Lease was deriving income
from California sources through its regular and systematic channeling of its
moveable property into the state through its commonly controlled sister
corporation. In Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Association, Inc., 520
So.2d 1333 (Miss. 1987), the court struck down imposition of Mississippi
tax on out-of-state taxpayer's whose only Mississippi connection was
leased trucks domiciled in other states which passed through Mississippi
over routes chosen by the lessees, noting that:
While it is true that the term 'minimal connection' is employed in
the test articulated by the Supreme Court, subsequent
interpretations have noted that the corporation must "substantially"
avail itself to the privilege of doing business in the taxing state.
Such language certainly would appear to contemplate greater
activities than those present in this case.
Similarly, in Amerco Lease Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
Wisc. St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) Para. 202-952 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1988), the Court
held that the receipt of income from moveable property instate did not
constitute "doing business" in Wisconsin.
F. In-State Intangible Property
In all of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in which an out-of-state person
was found to have nexus for tax purposes, the out-of-state person had
some sort of physical presence within the taxing state. However, as
discussed below there have been several state court decisions in which
physical presence has not apparently been a prerequisite for a finding of
taxable nexus.
Part of the recent controversy has arisen as a result of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct. 1904
(1992). As discussed below, in Quill, the Court found that for sales and
use tax purposes, physical presence was required for an out-of-state
corporation to be required to collect a state's sales and use taxes.
However, in Quill, the Court stated that "[w]e have not, in our review of
other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement
that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not
imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule." Some states are narrowly
interpreting this seeming dictum in the Quill case as the Court's
acknowledgment of the lack of a physical presence standard for state taxes
other than sales and use taxes notwithstanding the lack of any U.S.
Supreme Court decisions directly supporting this conclusion.
In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, No. 23866 (S.C.
S.Ct., July 6, 1993), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an out-
of-state corporation was subject to net income taxation even though the
corporation had no physical presence in the state. The court found that the
corporation's licensing of trademark rights to an instate company
established nexus under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
U.S. Constitution. Even though this case involved a passive investment
company (one which generally has no substantive operations and pays little,
if any, state tax), the court's decision was not limited to such passive
investment companies or to transactions between out-of-state corporations
and instate affiliates.
There is a present danger that this decision may be extended by state
departments of revenue to cover any business arrangement in which an
economic, but not a physical presence, exists. Financial institutions and
other financial service enterprises, passive investors of investment conduits,
manufacturers and dealers in computer software, franchisers,
telecommunications providers and other enterprises providing or assisting
in the transmission and/or dissemination of electronic information, and
other arrangements in which a person's intangible property or services or
used by others instate are some of the businesses likely affected by this
ruling.
Florida has adopted final regulations that impose income tax on
corporations that sell or license intangible property in the state. Fla.
Admin. Code Section 2C-1.01 l(l)(p). Wisconsin has also announced its
intention to follow the Geoffrey decision. Wisc. Dept. of Rev., Tax Release
1, I.S.&E. Newsletter 233, 8/11/95. Alabama, Massachusetts, and North
Carolina have also made similar announcements. In fact, Alabama has
instituted a voluntary compliance program until December 1, giving
taxpayers an opportunity to voluntarily come forward and limit liability to
three years and avoid imposition of penalties.
But see B.I. Moyle Associates, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, No.
87-S-141 (Wisc. Tax Appeals Com. 1990) (presence of intangible personal
property instate in the form of licensed computer programs insufficient to
create nexus).
G. In-State Economic Exploitation
Traditionally, the concept of nexus has focused on a taxpayer's physical
presence in the taxing state. Over the past quarter century, this focus
appears to be gradually shifting from a physical presence test to an
economic presence test. See Scripto, Inc., supra and Tyler Pipe Industries,
Inc., supra ("the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities
performed in the state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated
with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state
for sales").
This logic follows that of the dissent in the National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), decision in which the Court
ruled that a mail-order seller whose only contact with a state was through
catalogues and flyers mailed from outside the state and who had no
individuals soliciting sales within the state, no property within the state and
no local advertising did not have sufficient nexus to require collection of
Illinois' use tax.- The dissent stated that:
There should be no doubt that this large scale, systematic,
continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer
market is a sufficient "nexus" to require Bellas Hess to collect from
Illinois customers and to remit the use tax, especially when coupled
with the use of credit resources of residents of Illinois.... The
difference between the nature of the business conducted by the mail
order house and by the local enterprise is not entitled to
constitutional significance.
In the income tax area, the Oregon Supreme Court in the American
Refrigerator Transit Co. decision stated that:
The connection between the taxing state and the out-of-state
taxpayer is essentially an economic rather than a physical
relationship.
Nexus may be found even where neither property nor personnel of
the taxpayer is employed within the taxing state if it can be said that
the state substantially contributes to the production of the
taxpayer's income.
Of course, the taxpayer in this case did have property in the state.
Therefore, the above language might be regarded as dicta nongermane to
the rendering of the court's decision.
California and Wisconsin have aggressively pursued economic nexus
theories with regard to insurance companies which incidentally are not
protected by the Commerce Clause. See People v. United Life Insurance
Co., 427 P.2d 199 (1967), appealdism 'd, 389 U.S. 330 (1967) (mail-order
solicitation sufficient for state to regulate out-of-state insurance company);
and Ministers Life & Casualty Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal
dism'd, 385 U.S. 205 (1966).
H. In-State Agents
Traditionally, the acts of an agent are attributed to its principal. Thus, the
presence of an instate agent has been held sufficient to create taxable
presence instate for the out-of-state principal. Further, if an instate
affiliated corporation is acting as the agent for an out-of-state affiliate, the
state courts have found the requisite nexus. See Western Acceptance Co.
v. State of Florida, 447 So.2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (instate
affiliate collected monies owed out-of-state financing company which was
totally dependent on parent to perform necessary activities as it had no
employees or property) and CIT Financial Services Consumer Discount
Co. v. Director, 4 N.J.T.C. 568 (1982) (activities of instate corporation
acting as taxpayer's agent and doing business in New Jersey created nexus
for out-of-state affiliate).
In the sales tax area see Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. v. Mahin, 255 N.E.2d
458 (Ill. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 919 (1970), where an Illinois
appellate court found that the instate solicitation of sales on behalf of
Reader's Digest by corporate affiliates created nexus for the out-of-state
seller due to agency reasons; Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Board of
Equalization, 207 Cal. App. 3d 734 (Cal. St. App. 1989) (teachers
regarded as instate agents for out-of-state seller of books to students); In
re Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. , Kan. Bd. Tax App., No. 93-16709-DT,
1995. But see District Photo, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization,
Sacramento Super. Ct. No. 300847, unreported, Cal. App. 3d Dist. (1987)
(rental of two instate mail boxes not sufficient to create use tax collection
nexus as no agency relationship existed between out-of-state entity and
corporation hired to transport mail orders from mail boxes to airport).
The Vermont Department of Taxes has ruled that a fulfillment company
performing the following activities created nexus for its out-of-state client:
duplication of master tapes owned by the client, accounting and revenue
processing using Vermont bank accounts held by the client; storage and
shipping of the duplicated tapes; processing and filling orders for the
client's inventory which is held in Vermont. These activities were directly
attributable to the corporation as the instate company was acting as its
agent.
The agency theory has also been used to establish nexus in the state income
tax field. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held in Minnesota Tribune
Company v. Commissioner of Taxation, 37 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1949), that
an out-of-state parent corporation had income tax nexus in the state
because its instate subsidiary was its agent. According to the court:
Where a foreign corporation is organized for the purpose of holding
the controlling stock in a local corporation and directing its
management through the voting power of the stock thus held, or
where in addition to such ownership there exist circumstances
which render the local corporation merely the agent of the holding
corporation and the latter is present and acting in the state through
its officers, it may be held to be "doing business" within the state.
Similarly, in Amway Corporation v. Director of Revenue, 794 S.W.2d 666
(Mo. 1990), the Missouri Supreme Court held that Amway was liable for
the state's corporate income tax even though the company had no
employees or property in Missouri. The court concluded that Amway's
distributors in the state were acting as the company's agents.
Although the agency theory of nexus is firmly rooted in the law, it should
be noted that the state must show that the instate entity is, in fact, the agent
of the out-of-state corporation. If the taxpayer can show that the instate
entity is instead independent, attributional nexus will not be upheld. See,
e.g., Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Bates, 567 So.2d 190 (Miss.
1990) (sales tax nexus not present where no agency relationship existed)
and Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994) (out-
of-state book seller not required to collect use tax as instate teachers not
directed or controlled by seller).
In-State Partnership, LLC or S Corporation Interest
The majority of states will attribute nexus to an out-of-state corporation
whose only instate contact is through ownership of an interest in a flow-
through entity such as a partnership, limited liability corporation or S
corporation operating instate. For rulings concerning ownership of a
limited partnership interest, see Pennsylvania Board of Finance and
Revenue Docket No. R-13,147 (1990); Florida Technical Assistance
Advisement 88(C)1-004 (1988); Arizona Corporate Tax Ruling 93-9
(1993); Tennessee Revenue Ruling No. 95-15; and Illinois Department of
Revenue Private Letter Ruling 90-278 (1990) among others. A few states
(e.g., Texas, Georgia, Tennessee) may not tax out-of-state corporate
limited partners whose involvement in the partnership is truly as a passive
investor. As a general rule, a general partner would be taxable under
general agency principles. It is expected that the taxation of a limited
liability company would follow that of a limited partnership. The practical
result is the same for S corporations even though a number of states have
instituted agreements that out-of-state shareholders have to sign in order to
receive S corporation treatment instate in case of a challenge to their ability
to tax the out-of-state shareholder based solely on the ownership interest
and activities of the S corporation.
J. In-State Affiliates
The presence of instate affiliates should not per se create any nexus
implications. However, the corporate affiliation does raise questions of
whether the instate affiliate may be acting as agent for the out-of-state
affiliate thereby subjecting the out-of-state affiliate to the state's taxing
power.
A number of cases have arisen in the sales and use tax area in which the
presence of instate affiliates which were not acting as agents for the out-of-
state affiliate did not create a use tax collection duty on behalf of the out-
of-state affiliate. See Bloomingdale 's By Mail, Ltd v. Commonwealth
Department of Revenue, 567 A.2d 773 (Penn. Commw. Ct. 1989)
(occasional return of mail order merchandise to instate affiliate and use of
similar advertising themes and motifs not sufficient to create agency
relationship); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, No. CV87-033861 IS
(Hartford Superior Ct. 1990) ("even as part of a deliberate tax avoidance
strategy, the fact that Folio is incorporated as an entity separate from Saks-
Stamford and Saks & Company does not, standing alone, permit a taxing
authority to disregard Folio's corporate identity"); Lands'End, Inc. v.
California Bd. of Equalization, No. 620135 (Ca. Super. Ct. 1991).
In Current, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, No. A061750 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994), a California court of appeal held that Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code
Section 6203(g), as applied to the taxpayer, was unconstitutional. This
section imposes a use tax collection responsibility on "retailers owned or
.controlled by the same interest which own or control any retailer engaged
in business in the same or similar line of business within the state." Critical
to the decision was the fact that neither the parent nor the subsidiary
corporation was the alter ego or agent of the other for any purpose. Each
owned, operated and maintained its own business assets, conducted its own
business transactions, hired and paid its own employees, and maintained its
own accounts and records.
In SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy, Ohio S.Ct., 99 Ohio St. 3d 1
(1995), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the State cannot impute nexus to
a company lacking physical presence in Ohio on the basis that a sister
company had physical presence in Ohio. The court held that the out-of-
state and instate corporations were separate and distinct legal entities.
Since SFA itself had no physical presence instate and had no agents
operating instate, nexus could not be imputed.
Other states have used similar arguments to the agency theory, instead
looking to whether the instate entity is acting as the alter ego of the out-of-
state entity in which case the separate corporate existence of the out-of-
state entity should be ignored. A series of New York State Tax
Commission opinions have subjected out-of-state subsidiaries of parent
corporations doing business in New York to use tax collection
responsibilities. If the affairs of the subsidiary or the parent are so
dominated and controlled by the other entity so that one entity is the alter
ego of the other, then the existence of nexus for one will create nexus for
the other entity. See Spencer Gifts, Inc., New York Advisory Opinion No.
S851028A, TSB-A-86(37)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, Sept. 18, 1986);
and Harfred Operating Corporation, New York Advisory Opinion No.
S850318A, TSB-A-86(28)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, July 19, 1986). See
also CIT Financial Services Consumer Discount Co. v. Director, Division
of Taxation, 4 N.J. Tax Rptr. (CCH) Para. 201-026 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1982)
(out-of-state affiliate subject to income tax due to activities of instate
affiliates: "where the separate corporate entities of related corporations are
not preserved in the conduct of their overall business, each corporation is
regarded as the agent or alter ego of the other so that the presence of one
corporation in a state is the presence of the other.").
Other states have applied a "unitary theory" to determine whether nexus
for affiliates exists. Under a unitary theory of taxation, separate corporate
entities engaged in a single (unitary) business may be required to report
business income on a combined basis. Thus, an out-of-state affiliate which,
standing alone, lacks nexus, effectively can be taxed through inclusion in a
combined report with an affiliate which has nexus. A unitary business is
generally one where there is a high degree of interrelationship and
.interdependence among the activities of the related companies. The unitary
theory is primarily used in the apportionment area.
Application of the unitary business principle outside its traditional sphere
may be considered misplaced. However, a number of states have
attempted to assert jurisdiction based on the unitary relationship of an out-
of-state company with an instate affiliate. See, e.g., Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Armco Export Sales Corp., 572 A.2d 562 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.
1990) (DISC subject to Maryland income taxation based on unitary
relationship with instate parent); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, W.V. Tax Rptr.
(CCH) Para. 200-333 (W.V. Cir. Ct. 1988) (five affiliates of instate entity
subject to gross receipts taxation due to unitary relationship with instate
affiliate). But see SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, supra.
K. Sporadic In-State Presence
In Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954), the Court ruled
that Maryland could not constitutionally impose a use tax obligation on a
Delaware seller whose only contacts with Maryland was the mailing of
circulars to former customers in Maryland, advertising through newspapers
and radio and delivery of goods purchased out-of-state through the sellers'
trucks. The Court stated that "there is a wide gulf between [the] type of
active and aggressive operation within a taxing state and the occasional
delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other
than the incidental effects of general advertising." But see Good's
Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145
(Iowa 1986) (purposefully directed television advertising and regular
delivery sufficient to create use tax collection nexus); Cooey-Bentz Co. v.
Lindley, 419 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio 1981) (same result for instate delivery,
installation and repair).
In Cole Brothers Circus, Inc. v. Huddleston, No. 01-A-01-9301-CH-
00004, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 386 (1993), an assessment against a
traveling circus which spent 29 days instate over a four-year period was
upheld.
In Orvis Co. Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 204 A.D.2d 916 (1994), and
Vermont Information Processing v. Tax Appeals, 206 A.D.2d 764 (1994),
the New York Court of Appeals held that anything "demonstrably" more
than the slightest presence will provide constitutional nexus. Orvis sold
mainly by mail-order but also made approximately four visits a year to as
many as 19 New York retailers. Vermont Information also sold mainly by
mail-order; however, it also made "troubleshooting" visits to customers to
.solve installation and other problems (approximately 40 visits over a three-
year period were made to New York customers).
The Court of Appeals held that these visits were both systematic and sales
related and therefore demonstrably exceeded a slightest presence. Based
upon its review of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the New York court
noted that these decisions did not introduce a "substantial" physical
presence test. The court viewed such a test as too exacting as it would
require a case-by-case examination of the facts in each situation
undermining the importance of the "bright line" physical presence test.
According to the court, a physical presence exceeding a slightest physical
presence is manifested by the presence of property or the conduct of
economic affairs by the taxpayer's personnel on its behalf. The decision
was not explicitly restricted to sales and use tax and may also apply to
other types of taxes.
However, in Share International, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, Fla.
Dist. Ct. App., No. 93-4093 (1995), sufficient nexus was not found where
an affiliate of a Texas mail order seller conducted seminars instate for three
days per year at which products were sold (tax was collected on the sales
actually made in Florida). The court ruled that sporadic physical presence
was not sufficient to create the substantial nexus necessary for
constitutional nexus to be found.
Also, in Care Computer Systems, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue,
No. 1049-93-S (Az. Bd. Tax App., April 4, 1995), the Board held that an
out-of-state vendor that held title to two personal computers in Arizona,
had one salesperson visit per year, and 21 days of customer training by
non-resident personnel during the year did not have nexus with Arizona.
The Board held that the evidence did not show that the company had
significant property in the state or that it intended to establish a business
presence.
The Michigan Court of Claims has held that a taxpayer must demonstrate
"at least two weeks of solid effort in a state" before the taxpayer can be
considered to have substantial nexus in the state to avoid Michigan's sales
factor throwback rules. Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Michigan Department
of Treasury, No. 93-14739-CM (Sept. 30, 1994). In addition to the
number of days spent in a state, "the totality of the circumstances,"
including sales volume must be considered. See also Howmet Corp. v.
Department of Treasury, No. 161904 (Mich Ct. App., Aug. 18, 1995)
(physical presence by itself outside of Michigan not enough to avoid
throwback: actual extent of activities must be evaluated).
An Illinois trail court held that a Missouri retailer making regular deliveries
-into Illinois with its own trucks lack substantial nexus. Brown's Furniture
v. Department of Revenue, No. 90-CH-49 (Ill. 7th Jud. Cir., Apr. 20,
1994). The court concluded that the use tax was not uniformly applied to
taxpayers in similar situation, it discriminates against interstate commerce
and it was not fairly related to services provided by the state.
L. Mail Order Sellers: National Bellas Hess and its Progeny
In National Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), the
Court ruled that a state could not require an out-of-state corporation to
collect use tax when its only connection with the state was the mailing of
product catalogues to instate customers. The Court held that National
Bellas Hess lacked the requisite 'minimal connections' under the Due
Process Clause to allow imposition of Illinois' taxing jurisdiction. The
Court also raised two Commerce Clause concerns: that if the thousands of
jurisdictions imposing sales and use taxes imposed such taxes, the
obligations to which National Bellas Hess would be subject would have no
relationship to the benefits provided by the jurisdictions and that the
resultant recordkeeping and administrative burdens would violate the
purpose of the Commerce Clause -- to "ensure a national economy free
from such unjustifiable local entanglements."
M. Quill and its Aftermath
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S.Ct. 1904 (1992), the Court
reaffirmed its constitutional prohibition against state taxation of out-of-
state mail order sellers. Quill solicited sales by catalog, telephone, and
through national advertisements. It delivered merchandise to its customers
in North Dakota by mail or common carrier.
The state had assessed Quill under an anti-Bellas Hess statute because it
was engaged in the regular solicitation of sales by catalogues or the mail.
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute was
inconsistent with Bellas Hess but believed that "the foundational basis of
Bellas Hess has been eroded and the Supreme Court would so conclude."
The state in effect adopted an economic nexus test.
The Court reversed upholding the traditional physical presence nexus test.
The Court differentiated between the nexus standards of the Due Process
Clause and that of the Commerce Clause. The Court looked to the
differences in the constitutional underpinnings of the two Clauses
concluding that "the two standards are animated by different constitutional
concerns and policies." Thus, contacts that might meet Due Process
standards concerned with fairness and fair warning might not meet
Commerce Clause concerns regarding the effect of state regulation on the
national economy.
The Court explicitly overruled the physical presence requirement for Due
Process purposes:
[T]o the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due
Process Clause requires physical presence in a state for the
imposition of duty to collect use tax, we overrule those holdings as
superseded by developments in the law of due process.
However, the Court was unwilling to overturn its Commerce Clause
physical presence requirements, at least with respect to use tax collection.
The Court found that its holding in Bellas Hess was not inconsistent with
Complete Auto Transit and current Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Court believed that a bright-line test of physical presence which had guided
taxpayers and tax administrators for years and had created settled
expectations in the area should not be overturned, relying on stare decisis.
The MTC recently released a draft guideline regarding sales and use tax
constitutional nexus standards. Although the draft guideline contains
commonly accepted notions of activities or contacts constituting nexus for
Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause purposes, in certain respects
the guideline represents a broad, and possibly unsupported, interpretation
of sales and use tax nexus under the U.S. Constitution. Essentially, the
guideline largely adopts a nexus interpretation that virtually any contact or
activity, other than that which is de minimis, inadvertent, or by way of U.S.
mail or common carrier, constitutes substantial nexus under the Commerce
Clause. Moreover, the MTC apparently would ignore the brightline
physical presence test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Quill, by
adding a concept of "deemed physical presence." For example, advertising
directed at instate persons through local media (or "other local means of
electronic transmission") creates nexus under the guidelines, as does
granting an interest in or right to use intangible property.
The draft guideline is tentatively projected for MTC adoption in 1995;
however, no public hearings have been scheduled. Although impossible to
predict, it is unlikely that a majority of MTC member states will agree to
"push the envelope" of nexus as far as the draft guidelines allow.
IV. Public Law 86-272
As noted above, the Commerce Clause provides Congress with the power to
regulate interstate commerce. Congress has rarely exercised this power. The
major instance in which it did was the passage of Public Law 86-272. This statute
provides for a limitation on a state's power to subject nondomiciliary corporations
to the state's net income tax. In general, the statute provides that a state may not
impose a net income tax when a nondomiciliary corporation's only contact with
the state is the solicitation of orders of tangible personal property by its employees
if the orders are sent outside the state for approval or rejection and the
merchandise is shipped or delivered from a source outside the taxing state.
A. Enactment and Provisions
Public Law 86-272 was a congressional response to the Supreme Court's
suggestion that solicitation of business by a nondomiciliary corporation
engaged solely in interstate commerce within a state was sufficient contact
to justify taxation. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of
Revenue and International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, supra. Public Law 86-
272 was intended to be a stop-gap measure until a more detailed study of
the states' taxation of interstate business was made. However, even after
the study was complete, no further action was taken and the law has
remained on the books.
In general, Public Law 86-272 protects nondomiciliary corporations from
being subject to a state's net income based tax if the corporations only
contact with the state is (1) the solicitation of orders for the sale of tangible
personal property through employees or representatives where the orders
are sent outside the state for approval or rejection and are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the state; (2) the solicitation of
orders for the sale of tangible personal property through employees or
representatives in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer
of the seller's customer when the orders are sent outside the state for
approval and are filled by shipment or delivery from outside the state; or
(3) the solicitation or orders for sale or the actual making of a sale by an
independent contractor on behalf of the taxpayer even if the independent
contractor maintains an office in the state.
Public Law 86-272 is a limitation on the state's power to tax 'foreign'
sellers of tangible personal property. It does not apply to domestic
corporations (corporations incorporated in the state).
There has been some disagreement about whether the mere act of
qualifying to do business in the state obviates Public Law 86-272. Mass.
Letter Ruling 1984-78 and New Jersey State Tax News, Nov./Dec. 1989,
ruled that Public Law 86-272 does not apply. However, Letter from Chief
Counsel of the Franchise Tax Board; Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v.
Bajorski, 635 A.2d 771 (Conn. 1993); Kelly-Springfield Tire Company v.
Commissioner, Docket Nos. 62451-162455, Mass. App. Tax Bd. (1993);
and Pomco Graphics v. Director, Division of Taxation, N.J. Tax Ct.,
Docket No. 04-16-1526-89-CB (1993) have all held that qualification to
do business in a state does not remove the taxpayer from the protections of
Public Law 86-272. The MTC Guidelines discussed below have also
adopted this approach. However, corporations may still be subject to state
taxes based on net worth or fixed dollar minimum taxes.
It does not apply to service companies. Thus, service businesses such as
trucking and other transportation companies, pipelines, newspapers,
broadcasting companies, communication companies and insurance
companies are not governed by its limitations. See Pomco Graphics, supra
(commercial printer engaged in sale of tangible personal property not the
provision of services).
Public Law 86-272 does not generally apply to foreign commerce unless so
extended by state administrative decision. Note also that corporations are
not the only ones protected by Public Law 86-272. The statute itself refers
to "any person." The facts of at least two cases bear out that out-of-state
sole proprietors (and presumably partnerships) are protected. See, e.g.,
John K Song v. Alaska Department of Revenue, 622 P.2d 967 (Alaska
1981) and Mitchell Sorkin, NYS Advisory Opinion, TSB-A-91(1)I (1991).
Public Law 86-272 only applies to net income taxes. Other taxes such as
the Michigan single business tax, Indiana gross income tax and taxes based
on net worth are not covered.
There are a number of key questions unanswered by the statutory
language: (1) what activities are included within the term "solicitation?";
(2) what activities are included within the term "delivery?"; (3) what is an
independent contractor? For years, taxpayers were left to fend for
themselves on a state-by-state, court-by-court basis.
B. State Cases Interpreting
Even though Public Law 86-272 is a federal statute, federal courts
generally lack jurisdiction to hear cases involving its application by virtue
of the federal Anti-Tax Injunction Act. As a result, prior to the Wrigley
case discussed below, the statute was construed and applied almost
exclusively in state courts.
Some state courts interpreted solicitation broadly allowing a number of
acts which were incidental to the act of asking a customer to purchase a
product to be performed instate without creating taxable nexus. Some of
these cases interpret solicitation to include those acts which customarily
lead to the placing of orders as opposed to those acts which follow as a
natural result of the order. More liberal cases overlook the pre-sale/post-
sale distinction and focus on whether the activities performed instate are
incidental to the sale.
Cases Interpreting Solicitation Broadly:
Coors Porcelain Co. v. State of Colorado, 517 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1973)
(taxpayer not allowed to apportion income out of Colorado even though
field representatives maintained offices out-of-state and made deliveries)
Muro Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Crystal, No. 524693 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1994) (indirect solicitation activities ("detailing") by pharmaceutical
company representatives who call upon physicians to ask them to prescribe
their products ancillary to solicitation)
Indiana Department of Revenue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 416 N.E.2d
1264 (Ind. 1981) (directing displays, shipping coordination, pricing
products, coordinating deliveries, checking inventories did not exceed
solicitation)
West Publishing Co. v. Indiana Department of Revenue, 524 N.E.2d 1329
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1988) (infrequent acceptance of deposit checks and collecting
of past due accounts de minimis and did not exceed solicitation)
A. W. Chesterton Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 91-P-764 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1994) (activities such as handling customer complaints, providing
customer and distributor training ancillary to solicitation; perhaps, only
approving orders would exceed protections)
CIBA Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 382
S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964) (company owned automobile, periodic instate
sales meetings and handing out of samples and brochures did not exceed
solicitation)
Gillette Co. v. State Tax Commission, 393 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977) (advice in
the displaying of goods did not exceed solicitation)
In the Matter of the Petition of Westwood Associates, Inc., N.Y. St. Tax
Rptr. (CCH) Para. 252-254 (D.T.A., A.L.J. 1988) (de minimis instate
repair work and technical assistance insufficient to create nexus)
Hugo Bosca Company, Inc., N.Y. St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) Para. 251-752
(N.Y. St. Tax Comm. 1987) (leasing of instate showroom exceeded
solicitation)
U.S. Tobacco Co. v. Pennsylvania, 386 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
880 (1978) (company car, checking of inventory, setting up displays,
disbursing of free samples and occasional sale of samples did not exceed
solicitation)
John Ownby Co. v. Butler, 365 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. 1963) (taxpayer not
allowed to apportion income even though taxpayer had inventory in public
warehouses and with agents out-of-state)
State Court Decisions Interpreting Solicitation Narrowly
Hervey v. AMFBeaird, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 557 (Ark. 1971) (presence of
consigned inventory, checking of inventory and accepting of payments
exceeded solicitation)
US. Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 801 S.W.2d 256 (Ark. 1990) (presence of
inventory instate from which retailers' supplies replenished exceeded
solicitation)
Appeal ofAqua Aerobic Systems, Inc., Cal. State Bd. of Equal., No. 85-
SBE-133 (1986) (warranty repairs and installation exceeded solicitation)
Appeal of Schwinn Sales West, Inc., Cal. St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) Para. 410-
621 (S.B.E. 1988) (conduct of service schools instate exceeded
solicitation)
Jantzen, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 29 (D.C. 1978) (office
instate exceeded solicitation)
In the Matter of Raymond E. Campbell & Associates, Ltd., Iowa St. Tax
Rptr. (CCH) Para. 200-483 (Iowa Dept. Rev. 1988) (training seminars,
review of design and construction problems and resolving of customer
complaints exceeded solicitation)
Gillette Company v. Michigan Department of the Treasury, 497 N.W.2d
595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (single business tax not a net income tax
protected by Public Law 86-272 therefore solicitation sufficient to create
nexus)
Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 270 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402
U.S. 902 (1971) (instate supervision of salespersons, review of displays,
taking of inventories exceeded solicitation)
Drackett Products Co. v. Conrad, 370 N.W.2d 723 AN.D. 1985) (replacing
damaged merchandise, checking product inventory, pricing items, tracing
late shipments, selling displays and monitoring product shelf placement
exceeded solicitation)
National Tires, Inc. v. Lindley, 426 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. Ct. 1980)
(reviewing inventories, replacing old inventories, insuring credit,
negotiating sales prices and setting up displays exceeded solicitation)
As noted above, the renting of a showroom in a state is generally sufficient
to create nexus. As noted by the New York Tax Appeals Tribunal: "In
our view, leasing real property in the State, no matter how necessary for
the corporation to conduct its solicitation, is an act that is so qualitatively
different from solicitation that it cannot be considered merely an aspect of
solicitation.... ." Hugo Bosca Company, Inc., New York Division of Tax
Appeals, No. 803558 (1990). See also In re: Appeal of Hauserman, Inc.,
Calif St. Bd. of Equal., No. 93-SBE-103 (1993). Note the MTC
Guidelines discussed below would allow rental of showroom in a state for a
period not to exceed two weeks without the activity exceeding solicitation.
Delivery
Another issue arising from Public Law 86-272 which has not currently
received the attention that the scope of solicitation has is the scope of
delivery. This issue was addressed in a limited fashion by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 409
U.S. 275 (1972), in which the Court held that delivery of goods to a
taxpayer's instate representatives who in turn delivered the product to the
taxpayer's customers was taxable. Since this case dealt with the sale of
alcoholic beverages which the state could regulate the manner in which
products were sold instate, its application appears limited.
In Olympia Brewing Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 516 P.2d 837 (Ore. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974), the delivery of goods in containers that
were required to remain in the state because of their nature was held to
exceed the protections of Public Law 86-272. Also, in Chattanooga Glass
Co. v. Strickland, 261 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. 1979), the presence of the
taxpayer's containers which were used to collect raw materials purchased
in the state were held to exceed the protections of Public Law 86-272.
Two decisions discussed above involving the taxpayer's right to apportion
income Coors Porcelain Co. and John Ownby Co. have been criticized as
they held that delivery of goods by the taxpayer's instate representatives
did not exceed solicitation.
The MTC has now addressed this issue and there are several state
-administrative pronouncements which are discussed below.
Local Taxes
Also, it is important to note that Public Law 86-272 only applies by its
terms to state taxation and not to local taxation. In Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 11 Ore. Tax Ct. Reports 332 (1990), the Oregon
Tax Court held that because the taxpayer had inventory within the state
even though not within the locality imposing a local income tax, the
taxpayer nevertheless was taxable within the locality due to activities of a
sales representative whose activities otherwise did not exceed Public Law
86-272. New York City has issued a similar ruling. New York City Tax
Rules, Title 19, Section 1 1-04(d)(1 1).
However, at least one court has extended the Commerce Clause's
protections to local commerce notwithstanding an explicit reference to
interstate commerce in the Clause. In General Motors Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, No. B073381 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d App. Dist., Div. Four, June 26,
1995), the Los Angeles business tax was held to discriminate on its face
and failed the internal consistency Commerce Clause test. Los Angeles
imposes an unallocated tax on the gross receipts of an in-city manufacturer
(manufacturing tax) and on the in-city receipts of manufacturers located
outside the city (selling tax). Under this scheme, goods manufactured and
sold within Los Angeles are not subject to the selling tax, but an out-of-city
manufacturer who sells into Los Angeles is subject to the selling tax. The
court held that this discriminated against interstate commerce since
manufacturers selling in Los Angeles are treated differently depending on
where the goods were manufactured. Further the court held the
unapportioned tax on Los Angeles manufacturers unconstitutional since it
could result in multiple taxation.
Franchise, Net Worth and Minimum Taxes
Since Public Law 86-272 only applies to net income taxes, the question
also arises as to whether a tax is a net income tax. As noted above, in
Gillette Company, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Michigan
Single Business Tax was not a net income tax to which Public Law 86-272
applied despite an earlier administrative ruling to the contrary. Note that
Public Law 86-272 also does not apply to capital or net worth taxes so the
protections may extend to the net income component of the dual taxes
imposed by Texas and Ohio, but not to the net worth components. Note
that the protections would not apply to other taxes such as the Indiana
gross income tax. Also, the protections may not apply to minimum taxes
or flat taxes (witness New Jersey's imposition of its $50 minimum tax on
corporations which only solicit sales instate, New Jersey Div. of Taxation,
.24.NJ. State Tax News 3, Summer 1995).
Apparently, a taxpayer may be preparing to challenge the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Clairol, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 518 A.2d
1165 (Pa. 1986) which held that an out-of-state corporation was subject to
franchise tax even though its instate activities did not exceed solicitation.
The taxpayer will argue that Public Law 86-272 applies to the franchise tax
since net income is a major component in computing capitol stock value
under the fixed formula. Similar challenges apparently are also apparently
underway in Texas where the taxpayer has lost at the administrative law
judge level. See Comptroller Decisions No. 31,578, 32,016, 32,017 and
32,018.
Independent Contractors
A final question under Public Law 86-272 is what is the distinction
between employees/agents whose maintenance of an instate office and
accepting of orders in a state would be sufficient to create taxable presence
and independent contractors who could engage in these activities in a state
without a finding of taxable nexus. Public Law 86-272 defines an
independent contractor as a "commission agent, broker, or other
independent contractor who is engaged in the selling, or soliciting of orders
for the sale of, tangible personal property for more than one principal and
who holds himself out as such in the regular course of this business
activities." However, a representative is defined as not being an
independent contractor. Due to this circular definition, the courts have
been forced to turn to local case law when faced with this definitional issue.
A reading of case law demonstrates that the key distinction between an
independent contractor and a representative is that the taxpayer maintains
control over its representatives but not over independent contractors.
Thus, in Herif'Jones Co. v. State Tax Commission, 430 P.2d 998 (Ore.
1967), the court held that the agents were not independent contractors,
relying on the fact that the agents had to post a fidelity bond and carry auto
insurance while the taxpayer controlled the agents' sales territories,
approved hiring and firing and supplied order blanks, sample cases and
advertising materials.
Similarly, in Tonka Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 169 N.W.2d 589
(Minn. 1969), the court affirmed a lower court's finding that the taxpayer's
agents were not independent contractors. The pertinent facts: the agents
were paid a commission; the agents had exclusive territory and could not
sell competing products; all of the orders were sent to the home office for
approval; the taxpayer maintained an office for the agents; and the agents
assisted in collection and shipments, handled defective merchandise,
maintained product displays and helped with advertising.
C. Federal Cases Interpreting Public Law 86-272
The U.S. Supreme Court finally had an opportunity to reach the issue of
what activities could be conducted in a state without exceeding the
protections afforded by Public Law 86-272 in Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue
v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S.Ct. 2447 (1992). Wrigley sold chewing
gum in Wisconsin through a resident sales force. The instate activities
included:
" the supplying of gum to retailers through agency stock checks (the
agent supplied the retailer with gum and sent them a bill for the gum
later);
" the storage of gum, display racks and promotional materials in
Wisconsin;
* the rental of space for the storage of these items
" provision of free display racks for gum which were filled with gum,
sometimes from the representatives' supplies
* the replacement of stale gum by the representative
" the regional manager's recruitment, training and evaluation of
employees; and
" the regional manager's intervention in particularly sensitive credit
disputes.
Wrigley argued for a broad definition of solicitation which would look to
the type of business involved and how sales were typically obtained by such
businesses and for the adoption of a de minimis standard which would
overlook certain minor non-solicitation activities. The state argued for a
narrow interpretation of solicitation which would include only pre-sale
activities strictly essential to making requests for sales.
The Court rejected both tests and instead drew its line between those
activities which were entirely ancillary to requests for purchases (those
which served no independent business function apart from their connection
to the soliciting of orders) and those activities which the company would
have engaged in anyway but chose to allocate to its instate sales force. The
Court clearly noted that it was not enough that the activity facilitate sales --
it must facilitate the requesting of sales. The Court also concluded that a
de minimis rule did exist and would apply if the activities in the aggregate
did not establish a "nontrivial additional connection with the taxing State."
The Court held that Wrigley was taxable due to the replacing of stale gum,
the supplying of gum through the agency stock checks and the storage of
such gum in the state. The instate recruitment, training and evaluation of
sales representatives and the use of hotels and homes for sales meetings,
the furnishing of display racks and the intervention in certain credit disputes
were ancillary to solicitation.
Although Wrigley provided more guidance to taxpayers than had
heretofore existed, the standards for both solicitation and de minimis
activities still remain somewhat nebulous. As the states continue to
narrowly interpret the Wrigley decision and Public Law 86-272, taxpayers
should take steps to insure that their activities are entirely ancillary to
requests for orders.
D. Multistate Tax Commission Interpretations of Public Law 86-272
Originally adopted by the signatory states in 1986, the Multistate Tax
Commission's Statement of Information Concerning Practices of the
Multistate Tax Commission and Signatory States Under Public Law 86-
272 lists certain activities that the member states will treat as "immune"
(not creating taxable nexus) and "nonimmune" (creating taxable nexus).
The MTC is an organization of approximately 20 states whose purpose is
to promote uniformity of state tax laws.
The Statement was amended after the Wrigley case was decided. After
three public hearings, the so-called Phase I Statement was adopted by 22
states plus the District of Columbia (Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and
Utah). New York, South Carolina and Wisconsin adopted similar versions
of the Statement. The Statement is a good indicator of how states will
interpret "solicitation" in future years.
The Statement indicated that the policy of its member states would be to
impose their net income taxes to the "fullest extent constitutionally
permissible." The Statement makes it clear that Public Law 86-272 only
applies to the sale of tangible personal property. The leasing, renting,
licensing or other disposition of tangible personal property, the sale of
intangible personal property or any other type of property is not covered by
Public Law 86-272.
The Statement defines "solicitation of orders" as speech or conduct that
explicitly or implicitly invites an order or activities that neither explicitly or
implicitly invite an order, but are entirely ancillary to requests for an order.
Ancillary activities are defined as those which "serve no independent
business function for the seller apart from their connection to the
solicitation of orders." Activities that seek to promote sales rather than
orders for sales are not immune.
The Statement, following the Wrigley decision, adopts a de minimis
standard. The term "de minimis" is defined as those activities that "when
taken together, establish only a trivial additional connection with the taxing
State." Any activity conducted on a regular or frequent basis or according
to company policy will not normally be considered to be trivial. The term
"de minimis," according to the Statement, should be measured on both a
qualitative and quantitative basis. The Statement establishes that the fact
that the tainted activities only account for a small portion of the business
conducted in the taxing state is not determinative of whether a de minimis
level of activity exists.
According to the Statement, the following instate activities are considered
to exceed solicitation:
* making repairs or providing maintenance
" collecting current or delinquent accounts
" investigating credit worthiness
" installation or supervision of installation
" conducting training courses other than for personnel involved only in
solicitation
" providing technical assistance if the purpose is other than the
facilitation of orders
" assisting in resolving customer complaints other than for the purpose of
ingratiating the sales personnel with the customer
" approving or accepting orders
" repossessing property
" securing deposits on sales
" picking up or replacing damaged or returned property
" hiring, training or supervising personnel, other than personnel involved
only in solicitation
" providing shipping information and coordinating deliveries
" maintaining a sample or display room in excess of two weeks
" carrying samples for sale or distribution for value
" owning, leasing or maintaining facilities or property instate such as
offices, warehouses, stock of goods, or a telephone answering service
that is formally attributed to the company or its agents in their agency
capacity (i.e., listed in a telephone directory under the company name)
* consigning tangible personal property to any person
* maintaining an office or place of business, in home or otherwise that is
paid for directly or indirectly by the company and that is formally
attributed to the company or to the agent in their agency capacity even
if used solely for solicitation
* agency stock checks
* conducting any other nonimmune activities not entirely ancillary to
orders
The following activities were listed in the Statement as being immune
activities:
* soliciting orders for sales by any type of advertising
* carrying samples for display or distribution without charge
* owning or furnishing autos to sales personnel
* passing inquiries and complaints on to the home office
* missionary sales activities
* checking customers' inventories without a charge for re-order but not
for other purposes such as quality control
* maintaining a sample room for less than two weeks
* recruitment, training or evaluation of sales personnel, including
occasional use of homes, hotels or similar places for meetings with
sales personnel
* maintaining by any sales employee an in-home office paid directly or
indirectly by the company that is not attributed to the company or to
the company's agents in their agency capacity
* mediating direct customer complaints when the purpose thereof is
solely for ingratiating the sales personnel with the customer and
facilitating requests for orders
The Statement also discusses independent contractors whose activities are
afforded greater immunity. However, the maintenance of inventory by an
independent contractor under consignment or otherwise (except for
purposes of display and solicitation) will cause a taxpayer to lose immunity.
After further study and public hearings, the Statement was further revised
with the following issues reconsidered:
In-home Office: a limited home office exemption exists to the extent
the company does not publicly hold itself out as having an instate office
and limits its use of the office to those activities permitted under Public
Law 86-272. Note that a telephone or other public listing within the
state would be considered a public representation not permitted;
whereas the normal distribution of business cards and stationery
identifying the employee's name and address, etc. would not be
considered a public representation. The Statement makes it clear that it
does not matter whether the company directly or indirectly pays for the
cost of maintaining the home office.
" Business Equipment: the use of cellular telephones, facsimile machines,
personal computers, automobiles, etc. solely in conducing immune
activities will be considered immune
" Delivery in Company Owned Trucks: the Statement recommends that
the delivery of goods by other than the U.S. mail or common carrier
not qualify for immunity. However, two other alternatives were
provided: all deliveries treated as exempt or deliveries by private carrier
for which a separate fee not charged treated as exempt. Massachusetts,
Florida, Virginia and Delaware had previously adopted similar rules. In
Massachusetts, the DOR has established a de minimis rule that a
company whose only connection with the state is making no more than
12 pickups, deliveries or trips through Massachusetts during the year
does not have nexus.
" Qualification to do Business Instate: the Statement recommends that
this not remove the protection of Public Law 86-272 (see earlier
discussion)
* Part of Tax Year to Which Immunity Attaches: the Statement
recommends that if immunity is lost for any part of the tax year,
immunity is lost for the entire tax year
* Other Practices: Public Law 86-272 should apply to foreign
commerce; account collection directly or through third parties is a
nonimmune activity; Public Law 86-272 does not apply to service
providers; and providing shipping information and delivery information
without consideration is an immune activity.
As of July 14, 1995, 14 states have adopted these revised
recommendations: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon and Rhode Island (Oregon and Rhode Island did not adopt
the delivery rules). Maine, Maryland and Minnesota have indicated that
they will not adopt the statement. Texas is in the process of adopting
similar versions of the statement.
IV. Virginia Rulings Concerning Nexus
A. Corporate Income Tax
Virginia imposes its corporate net income tax on every corporation
organized under Virginia law and every foreign corporation having income
from Virginia sources. Va. Code Section 58.1-400.
Income from Virginia sources is defined as "items of income, gain, loss and
deduction attributable to the ownership, sale, exchange or other disposition
of any interest in real or tangible personal property in Virginia or
attributable to a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in
Virginia or attributable to intangible personal property employed in a
business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in Virginia." Va. Reg.
-Section .630-3-302.
A foreign corporation whose only connection to Virginia is the receipt of
interest on notes secured by deeds of trust on property located in Virginia
will have no payroll or property in Virginia. It will also have no receipts in
Virginia as no income producing activities occurred in Virginia. Therefore,
no Virginia return is required to be filed.
Regulations
Virginia has adopted in regulations the provisions of U.S. Public Law 86-
272. Va. Reg.' Section 630-3-401.G. provides that:
Virginia is prohibited by federal law from imposing a net income tax
on certain foreign corporations which have income clearly derived
from Virginia sources but have insufficient activity in Virginia.
However, any additional business activities in Virginia which
exceed the limitation of federal law may subject the corporation to
the imposition of Virginia income tax on all of its income from
Virginia sources. Whether or not additional activities are sufficient
to subject a foreign corporation to the taxing jurisdiction of
Virginia is determined by the facts of each case. Consideration is
given to the nature, continuity, frequency and regularity of the
activities in Virginia, compared with the [same] elsewhere.
Proposed Regulations
The latest informal draft of proposed regulations provide more detailed
guidance regarding Virginia's rules for determining nexus and application
of Public Law 86-272. Va. Prop. Reg. Section 630-3-400.2.A. provides
that a tax is imposed on the Virginia taxable income of every domestic
corporation and of every foreign corporation having income from Virginia
sources.
A foreign corporation with income from Virginia sources is taxable unless
its activities in Virginia are limited to solicitation or are de minimis.
Registration of a foreign corporation requires such corporation to file a
return even though it may still have zero apportionment factors (i.e.,
registration does not remove the protections of Public Law 86-272).
A domestic corporation is subject to tax whether or not such corporation
has income from Virginia sources and cannot be protected by Public Law
86-272. Although subject to tax, the corporation may still owe no tax if it
does not have positive apportionment factors.
Proposed Regulations - Income from Virginia Sources
The informal draft of proposed Va. Reg. Section 630-3-302.1 provides
further guidance with respect to when a foreign corporation is taxable in
Virginia. The regulation provides that "a foreign corporation shall be
deemed to have income from Virginia sources if there is sufficient business
activity within Virginia to make any of the apportionment factors...
positive." Further examples of income from Virginia sources include:
" income associated with Virginia real property
" income associated with inventory for sale or distribution which is
maintained in Virginia
" owning or leasing of Virginia tangible personal property (for any
portion of the tax year)
* carrying on of a business within Virginia
In this regard, the proposed regulations clearly note that "the presence or
absence of physical activity within Virginia is not determinative; an
economic presence within Virginia is adequate to create income from
Virginia sources." The regulation provides as an example of an activity
creating income from Virginia sources as "exploitation of markets within
Virginia."
There are several instate activities which according to the proposed
regulations will not, by themselves, create income from Virginia sources:
" purchasing tangible personal property from a Virginia supplier where
the property is shipped outside of Virginia
" leasing property from a Virginia lessor if the property has a non-
Virginia situs
" acquiring services from a Virginia service provider where the services
are rendered outside of Virginia
* consigning tangible personal property for repairs in Virginia if the
property is used outside of Virginia
• receiving interest on notes, bonds, etc. secured by Virginia property
The draft regulations also provide additional guidance on when intangible
property creates taxable presence with Virginia. The rules provide that
"income from intangible personal property... is income from Virginia
sources if such property is used in Virginia." Example 2 explicitly provides
that an out-of-state corporation which owns tradenames and trademarks
which are licensed for use in Virginia is taxable in Virginia. This appears to
adopt a Geoffrey argument.
Proposed Regulations -- Financial Corporations
State and national banks, banking associations and trust companies are
exempt from income tax to the extent they are subject to the bank franchise
tax. Whether or not a foreign bank is subject to the bank franchise tax
depends on the bank's activities in Virginia. Many foreign banks without
branches instate may instead be subject to income tax. An out-of-state
financial corporation which limits its Virginia activities to the solicitation,
acquisition, and collection of loans by mail or electronic communications is
not taxable (instate collection in person would render the corporation
taxable unless it is de minimis). Holding property via foreclosure or other
means and leasing property which is used in Virginia will create nexus
(unless the lessor has no knowledge that the property is or will be used in
Virginia or such use is de minimis).
Proposed Regulations - Public Law 86-2 72 General
With respect to Public Law 86-272, Virginia generally adopts the federal
statutory language. However, Virginia adds that "the orders [must be]
filled by shipment or delivery by common carrier or contract carrier from
a point outside of Virginia." The regulation notes that Virginia narrowly
interprets Public Law 86-272.
The rule revises Virginia's long standing application of Public Law 86-272
to services, noting specifically that "solicitation of orders for anything other
than tangible personal property is not protected activity." Mixed
property/service transactions such as photographic development,
fabrication of a customer's materials, installation of equipment and
provision of architectural or engineering services; the sale, lease, rental or
license of real or intangible personal property; and the lease of tangible
personal property are not covered by Public Law 86-272.
Proposed Regulations - Public Law 86-272 Immune and Nonimmune
Activities
The same general definition as contained in the MTC Statement is adopted
for solicitation and activities ancillary to solicitation. Immune activities
include those enumerated in the MTC Statement above plus:
" -furnishing free display racks of de. minimis value; advising on display of
the corporation's products; or qualifying to do business in Virginia
" maintaining bank or brokerage accounts in Virginia
" ownership of property in transit through Virginia in possession of a
common or contract carrier
" occasionally storing property in a licensed public warehouse in Virginia
(unless deliveries are made to customers from such warehouses)
" having property in the custody of an independent contractor who is to
repair the property, to perform a step in the manufacturing process or
scrap or dispose of the property
Nonimmune activities are generally similar with the following exceptions.
The provision of technical services does not contain the exception for
assistance if the sole purpose is the facilitation of orders for sales.
Additional activities creating nexus include:
" holding meetings of directors, officers or employees
" supervising the operations of a franchisee
" providing display racks if ownership of the racks is not transferred to
the customer and the value of the racks is not de minimis
" using a corporation's own vehicles to deliver property unless de
minimis (12 or fewer contacts)
The rules contain similar language regarding de minimis provisions and
independent contractors. Note that the regulation states that "a foreign
corporation will not be subject to tax merely because one or more
independent contractors whose activities on behalf of such foreign
corporation consist solely of making sales of, or soliciting orders for,
tangible personal property, maintains an office in Virginia."
Commissioner's Decisions
Intangible Property. A taxpayer that offered customers access to third-
party computer data bases over long distance telephone lines is subject to
income tax on account of income attributable to intangible personal
property used in a business carried on in Virginia. Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 94-181 (June 13, 1994). However, the company may
be protected from Virginia taxation if the only instate activity is the
solicitation of sales under U.S. Public Law 86-272. Although the federal
statute does not apply to protect the solicitation of sales of
telecommunications services, the Department noted that its historical policy
has been to apply these standards to solicitation of other than tangible
property. [Note that the proposed regulation would alter this conclusion.]
Property. An out-of-state corporation whose only contact with Virginia
was the presence of a corporate aircraft for a period in excess of 60 days
was subject to the corporate income tax as the corporation had property in
Virginia. It is irrelevant whether the corporation earned any income from
the presence of the aircraft instate or did any other instate business. Ruling
of Commissioner, P.D. 91-2 (January 11, 1991).
Property. An out-of-state corporation did not have sufficient activities in
Virginia to subject it to Virginia income tax since its only property in
Virginia was imported tobacco which was being held in bonded storage by
the United States Customs Service. The tobacco was under the control of
the Customs Service and was not processed or handled in any way by the
taxpayer. Ruling of Commissioner (July 1, 1983).
Property. Storage of manufactured product instate sufficient to create
Virginia nexus. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-125 (July 17, 1992).
Property. An out-of-state corporation which leased five aircraft to
commercial airlines which fly in and out of Virginia had nexus with Virginia
but probably no positive Virginia apportionment factor. Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 94-291 (September 26, 1994).
Agency. DISC income which is commingled with the income of a Virginia
based corporation is taxable to that corporation even if the DISC has no
nexus with Virginia. Ruling of Commissioner (February 17, 1984). An
instate corporation which is the agent of an out-of-state corporation can
create nexus for the out-of-state corporation through this agency.
Commonwealth of Virginia v. General Electric Company, 372 S.E.2d 599
(1988).
Solicitation. An out-of-state manufacturing corporation is subject to
Virginia income taxation because: perishable products carried by the
salesmen to replace out-of-date products on a retailer's display constituted
inventory, rather than sales samples, the sales persons were engaged in
quality control and management responsibilities and they supplied display
stands to retailers. [Note that the last item may be protected under
Wrigley.] Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 88-146 (June 20, 1988).
Solicitation. An out-of-state corporation which had instate district
managers which solicited sales of tangible personal property and provided
technical support and training for its franchisees was subject to Virginia
income taxation. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-64 (May 4, 1992).
Solicitation. Handling of customer complaints sufficient to create Virginia
nexus (but see MTC guidelines). Orders subject to home office credit
.check requirement but not home office approval.by themselves not
sufficient to create Virginia nexus. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-150
(August 24, 1992).
Solicitation. Installation, testing and training with respect to computer
hardware and software created nexus in Virginia for an out-of-state
corporation. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-75 (March 17, 1993). The
ruling notes that Virginia extends protection of Public Law 86-272 to sale
of intangible property as well as tangible personal property [apparently
overturned by the proposed regulation].
Solicitation. Provision of technical assistance in installation and
maintenance sufficient to establish corporate income tax nexus. Ruling of
Commissioner (October 8, 1982).
Solicitation. Corporation whose field representatives visited Virginia once
or twice a year did not have sufficient nexus for corporate income tax
purposes. Ruling of Commissioner (December 20, 1982).
Solicitation. The presence of instate salespersons who advise customers
on advertising and display methods, unpack merchandise and place it on
shelves, inspect inventory levels, and recommend new dealers did not
create nexus as such activities were ancillary to solicitation. However, the
inspection of damaged merchandise and investigation of how the
merchandise was damaged were not protected activities. The provision of
display racks at no cost to retailers could be ancillary to solicitation.
However, elaborate displays owned by the taxpayer would generally
constitute property in Virginia. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-111
(April 14, 1994).
Service Companies. An out-of-state corporation which provided operator
assistance and direct-dial services outside of Virginia had income from
Virginia sources even though it did not direct bill any customer in Virginia
or have any Virginia accounts receivable. However, the taxpayer probably
did not have positive apportionment factors. The ruling also notes that
Virginia applies Public Law 86-272 to the sale of services and intangible
property. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-310 (October 11, 1994).
Service Companies. Motor carrier subject to Virginia taxation due to
vehicle miles instate. Public Law 86-272 does not apply to service
company providing trucking services. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-84
(June 1, 1992). -See also Commonwealth of Virginia v. B.. McAdams,
Inc., 317 S.E.2d 788 (1984).
Delivery. An out-of-state corporation whose only contact with Virginia
was the delivery of tangible personal property in its own vehicles was
subject to Virginia income taxation. The operation of the taxpayer's trucks
in Virginia, in the Department's view, clearly exceeded solicitation. Ruling
of Commissioner, P.D. 92-230 (November 9, 1992). The policy underlying
this ruling apparently is the subject of litigation in National Private Truck
Council, Inc. v. Payne. See also Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-59
(March 11, 1993) (same ruling with respect to leased vehicles); and Ruling
of Commissioner, P.D. 94-132 (April 26, 1994) (deliveries to single
Virginia customer sufficient to create nexus).
Independent Contractor. An out-of-state corporation who was the sole
employer of certain instate contractors was taxable in Virginia because they
were regarded as agents. To be treated as independent contractors, the
contractors must represent more than one principal. Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 94-113 (April 14, 1994).
B. Income Tax Nexus - Ownership of Partnership Interests
Virginia requires the pass through of income or loss from both general and
limited partnerships to their corporate and individual general and limited
partners. See Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 88-165 (June 29, 1988).
Therefore, ownership of an interest in either a general or limited
partnership which is conducting a trade or business in Virginia will subject
the general or limited partner to Virginia taxation.
Va. Reg. Section 630-3-409.A.2.b. provides that "each item of partnership
property shall have the same character for a corporate general partner as if
direct corporate ownership of the property existed." Thus pass-through of
the partnership property factors is required for general partners. Further, in
Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 88-226 (July 29, 1988), pass-through of the
sales and payroll factors was also required for general partners.
In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 88-172 (June 29, 1988) and Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 88-235 (August 10, 1988), pass-through of the factors
to a limited partner was not allowed. There was no mention in either ruling
of the percentage interest the corporate limited partner held in the limited
partnership.
In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-60 (May 1, 1992), a corporation held
both a general and limited partnership interest in a partnership. The
Department ruled that the general partnership interest controlled and that
full pass-through of the partnership's factors was-allowed. Note that if the
partner was acting as a general partner then the limited partnership interest,
in effect, should have been treated as a general partnership interest.
In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-219 (October 30, 1992), the
Department did not allow pass through of factors to a limited partner who
owned a 15% interest in a limited partnership.
In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 95-19 (February 13, 1995), the
Department was confronted with a situation where one related party was a
99% limited partner and another a 1% general partner. The Department
ruled that it would not allow 99% of the partnership's income to escape
Virginia taxation. Therefore, its earlier ruling was modified. The
Department arbitrarily issued guidance, pending issuance of regulations, as
to when flow-through of a limited partner's factors would not be required:
(1) the general partners are unrelated parties; (2) the limited partnership
interest held by the taxpayer and all related parties did not exceed 10% of
the profits and capital interests of the partnership and (3) the structure of
the partnership was not primarily a device to avoid Virginia taxation of the
partnership's income.
The informal draft of the proposed regulations state that when a foreign
corporation is a general or limited partner in a partnership and the
partnership has income from Virginia sources, the partnership's activities
will be imputed proportionally to the partners. Draft Va. Reg. Section
630-3-400.D.
Nonresident individual limited partners are subject to tax on the limited
partnership's income allocated and apportioned to Virginia if the
partnership conducts a trade or business in Virginia. See, e.g., Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 91-51 (March 28, 1991) and Ruling of Commissioner,
P.D. 88-232 (July 29, 1988). In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-275
(September 16, 1994), limited partners in a "hedge fund" based in Virginia
with no property or payroll in Virginia were not viewed to be conducting
an active business so no flow-through of income created.
In Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-240 (August 5, 1994), the Department
ruled that an S corporation which was a limited partner in a Louisiana
manufacturing partnership could flow-through factors to prevent a non-
Virginia shareholder in the S corporation from being taxed on 100% of the
income from the limited partnership in Virginia without a credit for taxes
paid Louisiana being granted.
C. Income Tax Nexus - Ability to Apportion
The same nexus rules used to determine when an out-of-state corporation
has to file Virginia income tax returns and pay Virginia tax also apply in
determining when Virginia corporations may allocate and apportion their
income out of Virginia and thus not pay tax on 100% of their income to
Virginia. Under Va. Code Section 58.1-406 a corporation "having income
from business activity which is taxable both within and without the
Commonwealth shall allocate and apportion its Virginia taxable income."
The regulations further provide that a corporation "is presumed to be doing
business entirely within Virginia unless it is subject to one of the following
taxes in another state: a tax imposed on net income; or a franchise tax
measured by net income; or a franchise tax for the privilege of doing
business." The term state includes foreign countries. A corporation is
subject to one of these taxes if its activities in the state are sufficient to
allow the state to impose such a tax whether or not the state actually
imposes such a tax. Public Law 86-272 standards are applied (including to
foreign countries). Treaty provisions are not considered. See also Ruling
of Commissioner (April 5, 1983) (taxpayer had nexus in foreign countries
where employees regularly picked up damaged merchandise, inspected
inventories, collected delinquent payments, established customer credit
terms, arranged local advertising and provided consulting services; no
nexus where these services performed infrequently (once a year)).
If a consolidated return is filed the ability to apportion is determined on a
consolidated basis. Therefore, if one member of the group is taxable
outside of Virginia all members may apportion their income. See Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 91-293 (November 19, 1991).
A corporation incorporated in Virginia which had no business activities
other than ownership of interest in limited partnerships doing business
entirely within Virginia not required to apportion loss as corporation was
not taxable outside of Virginia. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-245
(December 28, 1993).
D. Income Tax Nexus - Filing of Consolidated Returns
Virginia regulations provide that:
Every corporation organized under the laws of Virginia and every
foreign corporation registered with the State Corporation
Commission for the privilege of doing business in Virginia shall file
a return with the Department of Taxation under this section. A
return must be filed even if the corporation has no income from
Virginia sources and no Virginia income tax is due. Va. Reg.
Section 630-3-441.
In the first year two or more members of an affiliated group of
corporations... are required to file Virginia returns, the group may
elect to file separate returns, a consolidated return or a combined
return. All returns for subsequent years must be filed on the same
basis unless permission to change is granted by the Department of
Taxation. The group may elect to file on a basis different from its
federal income tax return(s).
A consolidated return is a single return for all eligible members of
an affiliated group of corporations. Va. Reg. Section 630-3-442.
Draft Regulations
The informal draft of the proposed regulations concerning consolidated
returns revise and expand upon the above language. Members eligible to
join in the filing of a consolidated return are defined as those who are
subject to Virginia income tax, are affiliated, have income from Virginia
sources, are not exempt from tax and do not have different tax years. The
filing of a separate short year Virginia return upon the organization or
acquisition of a new member which creates an affiliated group is not
deemed the election of separate returns. The filing of the first return for
the tax year beginning on or after the date of organization or acquisition is
the filing which controls. See Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-65 (March
17, 1993) ( filing for first 12 month period controls) and Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 95-1 (January 4, 1995).
Draft Va. Reg. Section 630-3-302.1 provides that:
a foreign corporation shall be deemed to have income from Virginia
sources if there is sufficient business activity within Virginia to
make any of the apportionment factors.., positive even though no
portion of its gross or net income may be separately identified as
being derived directly from Virginia. A foreign corporation is not
deemed to have income from Virginia sources merely because such
corporation has received a certificate of authority from the State
Corporation Commission to transact business in Virginia.
Commissioner Decisions
A foreign parent corporation was excluded from a Virginia consolidated
return as it was not taxable in Virginia. The president and
secretary/treasurer of the parent made occasional visits to Virginia
(approximately 12 over a two-year period). However, the services they
performed instate were regarded as incidental to the services performed
out-of-state. The parent had no income from Virginia sources (other than
dividends) (no management fee was charged). Therefore, consolidated
filing was not allowed. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 90-181 (October 9,
1990).
An out-of-state corporation was taxable in Virginia as it sold tangible
property instate, provided installation and a one-week training program.
Additionally, management services were provided instate. Therefore, the
filing of a consolidated return was allowed. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D.
91-33 (March 18, 1991).
Wages paid by a parent company for officers of the parent and subsidiary
were treated as wages of the parent not the subsidiary. Therefore, the
subsidiary did not have a positive Virginia apportionment factor and thus
was not eligible to join in the filing of a Virginia consolidated income tax
return. There is a strong presumption that total wages reported to Virginia
for unemployment compensation purposes represent compensation paid in
Virginia by that entity. Since the wages were reported by the parent, the
wages could not be attributed to the subsidiary. Ruling of Commissioner,
P.D. 93-116 (April 29, 1993). See also Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-
222 (November 16, 1993).
The leasing of property to a related company in Virginia was sufficient to
create nexus so that a consolidated Virginia income tax return could be
filed. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-175 (June 8, 1994).
Registration in Virginia and the filing of a separate Virginia income tax
return without any activity in Virginia by an affiliate of a company
operating in Virginia did not preclude the electing of a consolidated return
in a later year when both companies had operations in Virginia. Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 94-368 (December 12, 1994). See also Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 94-228 (July 25, 1994) (generally, a corporation must
have sufficient business activity in Virginia to make one or more of the
applicable apportionment factors positive in order to be eligible to join in
the filing of a consolidated return); Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-238
(November 16, 1992); Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-90 (March 29,
1993) (nexus in previous and subsequent year and instate solicitation in the
current year not sufficient to create positive apportionment factor) and
Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-228 (July 25, 1994).
But see Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-175 (July 29, 1994) (subsidiary
which leased movable tangible personal property to parent in Virginia
which had nexus in Virginia but did not have positive apportionment
factors allowed to file combined return with parent); Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 92-81 (June 1, 1992) (consolidated group denied
permission to file separate returns even though one of two companies was
inactive in Virginia and had no income from Virginia sources as it was still
subject to Virginia tax and required to file a Virginia income tax return);
and Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-238 (November 16, 1992) *
("-Generally, corporations organized under Virginia law and foreign
corporations having income from Virginia sources subject to Virginia tax.
A corporation will have income from Virginia sources if there is sufficient
business activity within Virginia to make any one or more of the applicable
apportionment factors positive.").
The acquisition of an affiliated group of companies doing business in
Virginia did not enable the taxpayer to elect to file a consolidated Virginia
income tax return. The taxpayer was previously affiliated with companies
which also filed separate Virginia returns (note that the Virginia definition
of affiliation is broader than the federal definition of those corporations
allowed to file a consolidated return). Therefore, an election to file on a
separate return basis had been made and permission to change was not
granted. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-212 (July 5, 1994). See also
Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 95-10 (January 18, 1995).
Subsidiary had positive apportionment factors in Virginia due to
performance of personal service contract by employees of related entity
(i.e., created agency relationship) and thus costs of performance in Virginia
and could join in the filing of a consolidated return. Ruling of
Commissioner, P.D. 93-89 (March 29, 1993).
Corporation which previously filed consolidated in Virginia but started
filing separately when only one corporation was doing business in Virginia
allowed to elect consolidated filing when another subsidiary doing business
in Virginia organized. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-72 (March 18,
1993). In this regard, the draft regulations state that:
If, after electing consolidated filing the affiliated group is reduced
by reason of sale, merger, liquidation, or withdrawal to a single
corporation subject to Virginia income tax, the group is no longer
eligible to file a consolidated return and must file a separate return.
If another member of the group subsequently becomes subject to
Virginia income tax the consolidated election remains in effect and
a consolidated return will be required unless two or more separate
returns have been filed covering a period of at least 24 months. Va.
Draft Reg. Section 630-3-442.1 .B.7.
E. Sales and Use Tax Nexus
Under Virginia Code Section 58.1-612.C., a person is deemed to have
sufficient activity within Virginia to require registration for sales and use
tax purposes (and thus presumably nexus for such purposes) if the
taxpayer:
" Maintains or has within this Commonwealth, directly or through an
agent or subsidiary, an office, warehouse, or place of business of any
nature; [note the potential unconstitutionality of the subsidiary
provision]
* Solicits business in this Commonwealth by employees, independent
contractors, agents or other representatives;
* Advertises in newspapers or other periodicals printed and published
within this Commonwealth, on billboards or posters located in this
Commonwealth, or though materials distributed in this Commonwealth
by means other than the United States mail; [note that the local
advertising issue has not been affirmatively decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court -- based upon Quill this may not be enough without
some sort of physical. presence]
" Makes regular deliveries of tangible personal property within this
Commonwealth by means other than common carrier. A person shall
be deemed to be making regular deliveries hereunder if vehicles other
than those operated by a common carrier enter this Commonwealth
more than twelve times during a calendar year to deliver goods sold by
him;
" Solicits business in this Commonwealth on a continuous, regular,
seasonal, or systematic basis by means of advertising that is broadcast
or relayed from a transmitter within this Commonwealth or distributed
from a location within this Commonwealth [again the constitutionality
of this provision may be in doubt following the Quill decision]
* Solicits business in this Commonwealth by mail, if the solicitations are
continuous, regular, seasonal, or systematic and if the dealer benefits
from any banking, debt collection, or marketing activities occurring in
this Commonwealth or benefits from the location in this
Commonwealth of authorized installation, servicing, or repair facilities
[again doubts would appear to exist regarding the constitutionality of
this provision following the Quill decision];
" Is owned or controlled by the same interests which own or control a
business located within this Commonwealth [after the California and
Ohio decisions discussed above, this provision clearly appears
unconstitutional];
* Has a franchisee or licensee operating under the same trade name in
this Commonwealth if the franchisee or licensee is required to obtain a
certificate of registration under Section 58.1-613 [it would appear that
the constitutionality of this provision would turn on whether the
franchisee or licensee was an agent or alter ego of the out-of-state
franchisor or licensor]; or
Owns tangible personal property that is rented or leased to a consumer
in this Commonwealth or offers tangible personal property, on
approval, to consumers in this Commonwealth [the second part may be
unconstitutional as the state in Quill attempted unsuccessfully to raise
the issue that a -"return if not satisfied within 30 days for a full refund"
was a sale on approval].
Commissioner Decisions
Delivery. A retail furniture dealer located in another state had taxable
nexus in Virginia because it registered with the Department of Taxation for
collection of use tax on sales made to Virginia customers, it advertised in
the Richmond edition of a national newspaper and it hired a contract carrier
to deliver the furniture it sold in Virginia. Ruling of the Commissioner,
P.D., 93-141 (June 7, 1993). See also Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-
240 (December 28, 1993) (furniture dealer taxable due to directed
advertising and deliveries); and Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 90-49
(March 20, 1990) (out-of-state furniture dealer making more than 12
deliveries a year into state taxable).
Agency. An out-of-state corporation that hired subcontractors to install
tangible personal property in Virginia was required to register for the
collection of sales tax if an agency relationship existed with the
subcontractors. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-10 (January 7, 1994).
Under Virginia law, two factors are necessary in order for an agency
relationship to be established. First, the agent must be subject to the
principal's control, with regard to the work to be done and the manner of
performing it. Actual control is not the test: it is the right to control that is
determinative. Second, the work has to be done on the business of the
principal or for his benefit.
Services. In Ruling of Commissioner 94-206 (June 29, 1994), the
Department addressed the taxation of a transaction whereby a marketing
company assisted Virginia distributors in obtaining vending machines by
having an affiliate place an order with an unrelated out-of-state
manufacturer. The machines were delivered from the manufacturer to the
distributor by common carrier and title passed directly from the
manufacturer to the distributor. The marketing company collected a flat
fee for its services. The marketing company and its affiliate were not
required to collect sales and use tax as they were performing a service --
not selling tangible personal property. The manufacturer was not required
to collect sales and use tax unless the marketing company or its affiliate
was acting as the manufacturer's agent.
Property. A Delaware corporation which hangered an aircraft in Virginia
for over 60 days was subject to the aircraft use tax regardless of whether a
Virginia license for the aircraft was obtained. Ruling of Commissioner,
P.D. 91-2 (January 11, 1991).
Agents. An out-of-state corporation which made sales through
representatives in Virginia is taxable on sales made by such representatives
and on subsequent sales made by telephone. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D.
91-286 (November 8, 1991).
Agency. A subscription agency which made periodical purchases for
customers which were delivered directly from the publisher to the customer
but which were invoiced to the agency who then reinvoiced the customers
with a mark-up was subject to sales tax on the marked-up price of the
subscriptions. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 92-92 (June 5, 1992). The
transaction binds the credit of the agency since the publisher bills the
agency and depends on it to remit payment -- not the ultimate customer.
Gifts. A Virginia retailer is required to collect sales tax when a nonresident
purchaser orders an item by telephone or mail and directs the seller to send
the item directly to another out-of-state resident. The transaction is not an
exempt sale in interstate commerce since title and constructive possession
are transferred to the purchaser in Virginia when, at the direction of, and
for the benefit of the purchaser, the Virginia retailer mails the property or
delivers it to a common carrier for distribution as a gift to a recipient
outside Virginia. Opinion of Attorney General (February 23, 1991).
Independent Contractors. Use of instate telemarketing firm to make sales
rendered out-of-state magazine publisher subject to Virginia sales tax due
to instate activities of independent contractor. Ruling of Commissioner,
P.D. 92-136 (August 10, 1992).
Representatives. Instate presence of employees soliciting business and
installing equipment subjects out-of-state air conditioner seller subject to
Virginia sales and use tax. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 93-124 (May 4,
1993).
F. Withholding Tax Nexus
Presence of employees instate performing services rendered out-of-state
corporation subject to requirement to withhold Virginia taxes from the
employees' wages. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-208 (July 5, 1994).
G. Other Significant Developments
Sales and Use Tax Developments
The Virginia Department of Taxation has ruled that the electronic transfer
of information via telephone lines is a nontaxable service under Virginia
Regulation Section 630-10-97.1, but the transfer of information via
magnetic tape constitutes a transfer of tangible personal property subject to
taxation. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 95-68 (Mar. 30, 1995). The
taxpayer provided parts price updates to motor vehicle dealers either
electronically via telephone lines or through magnetic tapes. In
distinguishing the two transactions, the Department noted that the
regulation states that a taxable transaction occurs when standard
information is conveyed via tangible means (e.g., diskette, computer tape,
report, etc.).
Local Taxes
Cities and counties in Virginia are empowered to enact local taxes on the
sale offood and beverages or meals. Va. Code Section 58.1-3841. In an
Attorney General's ruling dated January 12, 1994, the Attorney General
addressed the application of the tax when the meal is prepared in a Virginia
locality but delivered or consumed outside of Virginia. The opinion states
that:
No state statute expressly authorizes a Virginia locality to exempt
the type of interstate transaction you describe or to give the seller a
credit against the meals tax due in the Virginia locality for a similar
tax paid in another state. The commerce clause of the federal
constitution, however, generally prohibits a local tax that subjects
interstate commerce to the risk of a double or multiple tax burden
to which intrastate commerce is not exposed.
The ruling suggests the adoption of the sales tax rules regarding exemption
of interstate sales (i.e., no sale in Virginia if neither title nor possession
transferred to purchaser in Virginia).
An earlier Attorney General's ruling also applied the Commerce Clause to
the business license tax. See Opinion of the Attorney General, December
1, 1978. However, in Short Brothers (USA), Inc. v. Arlington County,
Circuit Court of Arlington County, No. 920083, November 6, 1992, the
court sanctioned the imposition of an unapportioned tax on a taxpayer
headquartered in Arlington County as there was no evidence that any other
taxing jurisdiction actually did subject it to a tax based on gross receipts.
The court stated that the taxpayer produced no evidence of physical
presence in another jurisdiction sufficient to allow that jurisdiction to
impose a tax on the taxpayer (even though it maintained an inventory of
spare parts in Pennsylvania).
In American Woodmark Corp. v. City of Winchester, Circuit Court of the
City of Winchester, No. 93-291, September 21, 1994, the court held that a
corporation whose corporate headquarters was in the City of Winchester
qualified as a manufacturer for business license tax purposes even though
no manufacturing operations were conducted within the city. Extensive
manufacturing operations were conducted outside the city. The court
viewed the applicable statute as not one conferring an exemption but one
segregating property for taxation by the Commonwealth alone. Thus, the
statute was strictly construed against the state. The court ruled that the
term "manufacturing" was to be construed liberally and that an integrated
manufacturing business could not be segregated into its component parts in
order to maximize taxation. This decision has been appealed to the
Virginia Supreme Court. There is another case involving the same parties
at the circuit court level which appears to revisit the issue presented in
Short Brothers as to whether the locality in which a company is
headquartered can tax the company based upon 100% of its gross receipts.
Apportionment Rulings
The Virginia Department of Taxation has ruled that it will permit multistate
banks subject to the Virginia bank franchise tax to apportion net capital
based upon the ratio of Virginia core deposits to total bank core deposits.
Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-366 (December 8, 1994). Although
intrastate apportionment is based on total deposits, the Department of
Taxation indicated that interstate apportionment should be based only on
core deposits, which would exclude time certificates of deposit of
$100,000 or more from both the numerator and denominator of the ratio.
Passive Investment Companies
Under Virginia's intragroup transactions regulation, Va. Reg. Section 630-
3-446, the Department may reattribute items of income or deduction or
require consolidated reporting where income from business done in
Virginia is distorted. Under the regulation, distortion may exist when there
is an arrangement between one or more group members where the
consideration does not accurately reflect the income from business done in
Virginia and the result is distorting the income reported to Virginia.
Among those factors listed as creating a rebuttable presumption that
income is distorted are the existence of significant intragroup lending
transactions where the lending party has no other significant assets and the
source of the funds being lent is dividends or capital contributions.
However, an exception exists is the lending party is a discrete, separate
business enterprise with its own employees, office space and books and
records where the funds are lent at arm's-length rates and terms.
The Virginia Department of Taxation upheld an audit decision requiring a
parent and its passive investment company subsidiary to file a consolidated
return. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 95-86 (Apr. 26, 1995). The
Department concluded that the subsidiary lacked substantial economic
substance, noting that its tax return revealed no payroll expense, payroll
taxes, or similar expenses, and that its only reported assets were cash and a
large receivable from another affiliate. Additionally, there was no evidence
that the royalties were established at an arm' s-length rate. Moreover, the
Department questioned whether an arm's-length rate would be sufficient to
protect the transaction, noting that the taxpayer would not have transferred
the intangible asset to an unrelated party without consideration and gain
recognition. See also Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-179 (June 8,
1994).
The Department of Taxation has overturned an audit decision that required
a parent and its intellectual property holding company subsidiary to file a
consolidated return. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 94-309 (Oct. 11,
1994). The Department concluded that the subsidiary possessed economic
substance, noting that it managed substantial investments for its own
account; its books reflected actual cash transactions as opposed to paper
intercompany transactions; and it received royalty revenues from third
parties. The subsidiary also employed a part-time general manager to
handle its financial transactions, accounting, and administration; however,
its day-to-day banking and investment activities were outsourced to a non-
Virginia bank. The ruling also emphasized that the subsidiary incurred
routine business expenses and its royalty rates had been accepted by the
IRS and foreign tax authorities. See also Ruling of Commissioner, P.D.
94-66 (March 16, 1994) (royalty respected as royalty company had viable
economic substance (employees, assets and substantial business activity)
and royalties paid by unrelated third parties and sustained by foreign taxing
jurisdictions).
Individual Income Tax
The Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that the state must pay refunds to
federal retirees who did not settle the amount owed with the
Commonwealth. Virginia exempted the income of state employees but not
of federal employees. In 1989 in Davis v. Michigan Department of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a similar
Michigan statute unconstitutionally discriminated against the federal
retirees violating the intergovernmental tax immunity embodied in the
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that a refund
was required as the statute had expressly provided that one was available:
"If the court is satisfied that the applicant is erroneously or improperly
assessed with any taxes, the court may order that the assessment be
corrected. If the assessment exceeds the proper amount, the court may
order that the applicant be exonerated from the payment of so much as is
erroneously or improperly charged." The court held that the use of the
word "may" did not grant discretion in the ordering of refunds citing
previous cases. Even though a pre-deprivation remedy was available, the
fact that the taxpayer could have reasonably relied on the existence of a
post-deprivation remedy not to have pursued the pre-deprivation remedy
was sufficient to invalidate the failure to order refunds.
Virginia Enterprise Zone Revisions
Effective July 1, 1995, Virginia's enterprise zone program has been
substantially revised. Previously, up to 25 enterprise zones could exist
within the state with four tax incentives: a corporate income tax credit; an
individual income tax credit; an unemployment tax credit and a sales and
use tax exemption. The legislation increases the number of zones to 50.
The income tax credit now provides for a credit of up to 80% of the taxes
due Virginia on income attributable to the zone in year one and 60% in
years two through ten. The total credits provided by Virginia cannot
exceed $5 million annually in the aggregate. The unemployment and sales
tax credits are effectively repealed.
To be eligible for the credit, an entity must establish in a zone a new
business not previously conducted in Virginia by the taxpayer and 40% or
more of the employees must either be residents of the zone or have income
below 80% of the median income for the jurisdiction. Alternatively, an
existing business in a zone that increases the average number of its full time
employees employed within the zone by at least 10% over the lower of the
two preceding years' employment numbers with at least 40% of the
increased employment either being zone residents or having income below
80% of the median income for the jurisdiction also may qualify for the
credit.
Other credits and grants include an enterprise zone property investment
credit of up to 30% of qualified zone improvements (not to exceed
$125,000 over a five year period per taxpayer); employment grants for the
creation of full-time new positions ($1,000 if a zone resident or $500 if
not) for businesses located within a zone; discretionary grants to be made
by the legislature and local zone benefits. The zone credits will expire in
the year 2005 unless extended by the General Assembly.
